Sommers Island: photo, internal structure. How to get? Landing on Sommers Island

30.06.2020

In the history of the Great Patriotic War there were episodes whose information was kept in the depths of archives inaccessible to the general public. Often, these were evidence of errors made by the command during the fighting, which cost the lives to many fighters. One of these operations is a landing on Sommers Island, whose photo can be seen at the beginning of the article, have a newly illuminated on the print pages.

Fire barrier at the exit to the Baltic

In 1942, Soviet submarines intensified their activities in the Baltic Sea, inflicting the tangible damage to the Germans on their main communications. But the passage of a submarine from the Finnish bay to the waters of hostilities made it difficult to the enemy garrison, the location of the dislocation was small in size to Sommers Island. How to get to the central part of the Baltic, bypassing this melting mortal danger area - this is what has become a task that demanded an immediate solution.

A year before that, the Soviet division was based on the island, but due to a short-sighted decision of the command, he was left than immediately the Finns who fought on the side of Hitler took advantage. They posted their garrison there, consisting of the ninety-two-armed soldiers, delivered artillery guns and built four reference points of defense, turning, thus, a small island in size in

Split admiral

The weather in the summer of 1942 was clear, which allowed Finns to constantly conduct visual control over the surface of the bay and in time to record the movement of Soviet submarines. The command of the Baltic Fleet decided to plant a landing towards Sommers Island and master them. The development of the landing plan for the landing was charged with the captain of the first rank of I. Levchenko, who was previously demolished from Admirals for leaving Kerch.

For the rehabilitation of Levchenko, a combat operation was needed under his leadership, so it was very important for him to organize a military expedition to the island of Sommers, and he was very important for him for the execution of the order. But a hurry and led him. When preparing the capture of the island, many important factors were not taken into account, which played a fatal role later.

Garrison guarding the island

Based on erroneous intelligence, reweper that did not find it necessary, the developers proceeded from the fact that the garrison was only seventy people armed with two guns. As it turned out later, Sommers Island in Finnish bay defended ninety-two people.

At their disposal there were twelve guns (two of which were superior to the caliber of the Guns of Soviet boats), two large mortar, two anti-aircraft guns, as well as lightweight and heavy machine guns. The Soviet landing on the island of Sommers was superior to enemies with a number - two hundred and fifty people armed with ten machine gunners were involved in the landing, but significantly inferior to him in firepower.

Factors not taken into account when developing a plan

Intelligence did not cope with its task. Data transferred by it did not give a complete idea of \u200b\u200bhow Sommers Island defended. The internal structure of the protective structures erected on it was not presented when developing a planning plan for paratroopers. This largely complicated the position of paratroopers. In addition, the natural features were not taken into account that Sommers Island possessed.

The internal geostructure is very complex. Broken coastline It is a sticking of rocks protruding from water, the depth around which reaches five meters. The landing boats could not close to land, and many fighters, under the weight of the equipment tone, and without reaching the coast. This led to a completely unjustified loss of human lives. A radio communication with aviation supporting land supporting.

Sea exit landing ships

The operation began late in the evening on July 7, 1942. Ships with marine infantrymen left Lavensaari and took the course to Sommers Island. The Finnish bay on the path of their following way was continuously controlled by a group of aircraft, the responsibility of which was to warn sailors in the event of an opponent. At this time, Soviet bombers, accompanied by fighters, hit a blow to the island. They were replaced by attack aircraft who made attacks from small heights. In response, Finns opened a powerful anti-aircraft fire.

In the brine of the light of the white night boat approached the island, and the landing began. It turned out that it was impossible to stick to the rocky shore, and the boats under the enemy fire repeated several times an attempt. When unloading drowned the radio, thus, so without radio communications. Not yet hoping on the island, the detachment was the first losses. Two boats were damaged by the enemy's fire.

Unsuccessful start of the operation

A landing on Sommers Island planted with several parties, as ships as the approach. Singing poets White night served as sailors bad service. The surface of the bay was viewed at a great distance, and each approaching boat met the fire of Finnish artillery. One of them, trying to escape from enemy shells, ran into the stones. With great difficulty managed to remove the crew and weapons from it.

Others had to carry losses, planting fighters in places not provided for by the previously compiled plan. The beginning of the operation did not foresee its favorable outcome - of the two hundred and fifty two participants of the operation on Sommers Island, only one hundred sixty-four landed. The rest or died under the enemy's fire, or drowned in the Baltic waves.

Finnish command, having received a message about the attack of Soviet sailors, immediately sent a significant reinforcement to the aid of the island's garrison. Two and five guard boats were sent to the combat zone. On the way to the island, they had a fight with the Soviet torpedo boats, who, having received damage, could not stop the enemy.

Capture of the supporting point of Finns, and fighting in the air

By this time, the paratroopers managed to master one of the support points, which Finns strengthened Sommers Island. The bunker was captured, and as a result of a fierce battle from twenty-six of his defenders, only three remained three. The rest were killed. According to the plan, at this stage, the commander of Levchenko's operation was to send them to them, but, according to incomprehensible reasons, he did not do it than put the attackers in a difficult situation.

By the middle of the day, active fighting was unfolded in the air. Soviet pilots applied massive strikes at the positions of the enemy and on its ships. Finnish aviation tried to attack the boat approaching to the island, some of which received significant damage. As a result of the courts of the court of both sides, significant damage was obtained.

Second day assault of the island

By the morning of the next day, combat activity decreased somewhat. This is explained by the fact that the Soviet boats ended fuel, and the Finnish sailors were shot by all their ammunition. But at this time the first of the German ships were approaching the island of the finn. It was a merger m 18.

To nine o'clock in the morning, the events began to unfold in the direction unprofitable for the paratroopers. When approaching the island was shot down and sank attempting to deliver ammunition, which by that time were on the outcome. Finns succeeded at the Turunmaa Kannel boat and additional boats Shot to the island of Sommers the company reinforcement, consisting of a hundred nine people. Their appearance immediately changed the balance of power, ensuring the enemy not only with fire, but also numerical superiority.

In the middle of the day, the landing began by the time of time, but she was held, according to military historians, so unprofessional and unpropreitated that, as a result, only new unjustified victims were the result. At the same island, the fight continued with the former force. An urgent need arose to suppress the mortar battery of the enemy, but due to the lack of communication, paratroopers could not contact neither aviation or crews of boats nearby.

In the ring of enemy ships

Meanwhile, Sommers is an ever more dense ring surrounded the almost close Finnish and German vessels. Their massive fire fell on the marines leading the battle on the shore, and at the ships supported by their ships. According to the data available to military historians, during the failed operation to seize this strategic an important island Seven Soviet torpedo boats and one boat "Small Hunter" were surfplanted. In addition, serious damage was received by Kama Cavaneer, a basic trailer, as well as many torpedo and other vessels. In the sky over the island, four aircraft were shot down.

Sad outcome operation

This indiscriminately prepared and planned landing of the landing ended tragically. The island remained in the hands of Finns until 1944. Our side losses, information about which was published only in recent years, made up three hundred fifty-nine people killed and about hundreds of injured. The Finnish side lost hundred and twenty-nine people in this battle.

Despite the fact that the operation on the seizure of the island was completely failed, it is impossible to reproach its immediate participants. They fully fulfilled their duty. Wines lies with those who sent people to the right death without providing them with the necessary means of conducting battle, and without providing proper support for large ships of the Baltic Fleet.

Today, this island, who has become a monument to everyone who died on his rocky shores is visited by the groups of tourists, whose trips are organized by Russian and Finnish tourist firms.

(text Avtrov Photoep)
and then what felt in Psto:

Here they are rocks in the northeastern tip, who tried to land paratroopers in three women's excitement.

Stones in the surf strip are all perfectly run by storms, polished with ice. Covered with a thin, almost imperceptible eye with a layer of blue-green algae, which live in a dry form, waiting for the storm waves to bring them a lifeful moisture. But it is worth getting on them water, all, Amba - legs travel around. Do not walk, do not get out of the water without assistance with excitement is almost no possible.

Slipky coastal stones played their evil role when landing the landing on the rocky southeastern coast. It becomes clear why most machine guns "Maxim" were drowned when disembarked. And all the paratroopers were loaded with weapons and ammunition. In addition, they were fired from the mortars, guns and machine guns the entire Finnish garrison of the island of 93 people from Sushi, and Finnish canoners from the sea.

On granite rocks still visible traces from the breaks of shells.

That day there were an excitement of three points by force - this is the height of the wave to 0.75 m. With masks and in Zhenya's lasters and Sasha examine the underwater coastal part of the place of landing of the landing. We are looking for objects related to the landing to find out the place of disembarking and clarify the history of events here.

Alexey checks our and Finnish data on losses in people and weapons. How much captured the Finns of Maxim Machine guns. It seems two. So, the remaining eight were recessed when disembarking. And no wonder. Maximing is assembled 70 kg, even if you even remove the body of the machine gun from the machine, then individually all the same part weighs more than 30 kg.

Zhenya snapped and pulled a six kilogram bronze ring fastening of the reversing gear from under the water. After some time, found the remains of the optical instrument, small parts from the engine. Traces of the paratroopers themselves have not fell away. It is hindered to look for more green algae, which as a carpet long-haired coating tightly covers all the bottom at the coastal part. Circle shine fry and transparent shrimps. Water warmed up to 20-22 degrees. Then they found a few more items: a bronze valve with a broken copper pipe, small engine fragments.

Torpedo boat g-5

Our historians have a discussion on the topic as it came to the banks of the torpedo boat G-5. Alexey reads in the documents that during the departure after landing the landing, the torpedo boat flew to the shore, as the clutch of the rear engine of the left engine was turned on back, and right forward. We are trying to understand exactly how it looked on the basis of the seen cleft, where the boat was recessed. Could he cling to the stone in the middle of a little bay in which Sasha and Zhenya swam from the mask. What was the wind? Alexey immediately reads that the northern and excitement of 3 points, respectively, there were problems with the approach to the shore.

And why the remnants of this boat lie in another part of the island? They came to the conclusion that the Finns after the war dragged the remains of the boats in a more comfortable place to pull aside and the subsequent cutting on the recycle.

The third day - Wednesday.

On Wednesday, after breakfast, armed with Finnish military photos, we go to the search for the fraternal grave.

Paul a day were engaged in binding to the locality in the military Finnish photo. They pretended and so and so much. Focused on the configuration of stones and the location of Finnish pillars and the shed for boat accessories. Now they are certainly not. Therefore, they searched for the rocks of the walled wells for installing pillars. We defined the presumably place, with the help of Kirk and the shovel began to drain the pits in the pebbles.From the plexiglast found on the third floor in a locator post, we make a special tablet, pumping the main contours of the photo using a knife tip. That right through the plexiglas to impose the contour photos to the terrain. What and took up after lunch. Alexey Mukhin, by this time already wound up in the stone scree from the cobblestones, a depth of a depth near meter. For the sake of digging the pit, even refused to go for lunch and mercilessly burned in the sun. Abris at the plexiglas allowed more accurately determine the possible location of the fraternal grave.

Embedded to the place where the boat shed stood

and telephone columns.

It was decided to dig another pit in the stones near, in one and a half meters away.

They worked like this: one pickle loosened stones, after which the large stones were thrown by their hands, and the little thing was thrown into a shovel.

Rubbing with a scope of stones, there was such a ringing from the woven shovel that it was difficult to talk among themselves. A group of military correspondents in the heat, pouring down later, removed the process. Volodya and Igor, in turn taped on the shoulder a grave camera and a tripod to her. Igor joined us and with Kirk, and then with a shovel in his hands helped us as he could. The hard work continued until the evening and then Alexei came across a small bone-phalange from the human finger. Nearby was found rotted steel sleeve from the three-year one.

With the tripled energy began to tear the jumper between the wells and after two hours the pit turned into a "trench for shooting from the horse standing." However, nothing else was found. It was clear that we were somewhere nearby. But where? Bratsk burial cannot be small and difficult to lose it. A more thoroughly studying the area of \u200b\u200bthe pechenette ignechka, the territory of the pechenette, found four soldier's mugs with the inscription LMZ (Lysiev Metal Plant), the neck from the Soviet pre-war flask and somewhat curved and sighless from time shoes, suspiciously similar to sea boots of the war times.

On the coastal part, under a bunch of modern metallic garbage, they discovered pieces from a military boat.

High-speed screws made of steel. It can be seen what is made in wartime. Two powerful steering shaft. Wooden housing.

Next to it lay the items clearly related to the landing: opened zinc from the cartridges to a three-line with heavy bullets of arr. 1930 (on the lid was a yellow band), the cover from zinc to the RSD-33 grenades and the liner in the zinc box with the climbing climbing to the Limonons of F-1. Two telephone coils without a cable have discovered. It is unlikely that this was thrown post-war border guards, since all the subjects found were a pre-war release (except for one telephone coil of release 1942). Obaldev from the fight against stones on the scorching sun, the struck "home" in the barracks for dinner. Tomorrow we will continue to deepen and expand the pit in the morning.

Fourth day - Thursday.

We continue to expand the pit in the stone ister.

This time noticed that next to the jama stunned by the pit was a bunch of bricks. Within a radius of 50 meters there are no other bricks.

There was an assumption that, perhaps with these bricks, our soldiers or border guards made the burial. With tripled energy, we expand and deepen the pit. Nothing. No signs. There is a stupor. It can not be that the Finns would put the cross and wrote "128 paratroopers landed on July 8, 1942 were buried here. just. We begin to carefully study the terrain around our pit. In the meter we find suspiciously smooth, overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs up a pair of test shurts and discovers a former pit, just dug in stones, filled with a mixture of ash and sawdust. There was an assumption that this is the desired place.

Perhaps the fraternal grave was transferred, and ash fell into the pit and sawdust, so that they would not inflate them by the wind. And the bone from the finger remained on the surface and eventually fell through the stones to the depth of 20 cm. It means that the likelihood of soldiers moved to the 50s to the fraternal cemetery of the RKKKI warriors and the Baltic seafarers in Pine Bor. The dust of the military sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941-1945 on the islands of the Gulf of Finland were held here on the Islands of the Gulf of Finland: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Big and Small Tyuters. But this is to be checked in the military registration and enlistries and archives.

The second half of the day was decided to devote to the underwater examination of the intended place of the death of the torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, an ammunition and radio station drove the paratroopers. On the shore in the rocks found steel sparkmates from the boat. One of them was used for the construction of their Dot in 1943. Survey the underwater part of the coast.

Rocky shore begins deep crevices in a depth of 4-5 meters.

They managed to detect parts from the boat: two rowing shafts, the remains of a wooden trim, the scrubbing of curved dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, a sleeve from a 45-mm cannon and a large-caliber machine gun DSHK, sleeves from 20 mm. Schwak guns, cartridges for pistols TT and Mosina rifles.

All finds are marked and scratched stones, the shafts are bent.

Alexey pulls one of the rowing shafts of the boat ashore.

Some minor items found in gloomy clefts had to choose from the gap improvised mounting. Storms and ice, even at the depth, they as a hammer clogged into the slots under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be lifted to the surface, since they were depicted with huge boulders in a few girths. Terrible power These autumn and winter storm. Apparently everything that did not fall into the clefts, draws the storms to the depth.

Stone appears on archival photos.

Actually, here and he is in the background. Photographed on the other side.

Eh - it is necessary to carry out a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya sails to the shore with the next small parts of the boat: some copper tubes, steel corners, wires in lead isolation. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. Not there was something. Cursed algae and easy excitement interfere.

We take away from him. Sasha Imbobache, sophisticatedly swearing, keeps his hand for the elbow. He had twice twice the stones, while he left the water. Taking photos found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of the three killed in 1942 at the shore of the boats.

The island of everything was surrounded by 8 boats in 1942 (one type of MO, five M-5 torpedo boats, one T-3 torpedo boat and one type W-4) and 3 M-5 torpedo boats in the fall of 1941. Most of them are still at the bottom of the island.

Under water in the cleft, some kind of copper boxed tube sticks out.

But the mysterious thing is close to a receiver from Maxim, among the fry and the Baltic shrimp.

Separate parts of the torpedo boat D-3 number 22 raised from under the water.

The remains of the rowing shafts, with a bronze sleeve.

Fourth day - Thursday.

We continue to expand the pit in the stone ister.

This time noticed that next to the jama stunned by the pit was a bunch of bricks. Within a radius of 50 meters there are no other bricks.

The second half of the day was decided to devote to the underwater examination of the intended place of the death of the torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, an ammunition and radio station drove the paratroopers. On the shore in the rocks found steel sparkmates from the boat. One of them was used for the construction of their Dot in 1943. Survey the underwater part of the coast.

Rocky shore begins deep crevices in a depth of 4-5 meters.

They managed to detect parts from the boat: two rowing shafts, the remains of a wooden trim, the scrubbing of curved dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, a sleeve from a 45-mm cannon and a large-caliber machine gun DSHK, sleeves from 20 mm. Schwak guns, cartridges for pistols TT and Mosina rifles.

All finds are marked and scratched stones, the shafts are bent.

Alexey pulls one of the rowing shafts of the boat ashore.

Some minor items found in gloomy clefts had to choose from the gap improvised mounting. Storms and ice, even at the depth, they as a hammer clogged into the slots under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be lifted to the surface, since they were depicted with huge boulders in a few girths. Terrible power These autumn and winter storm. Apparently everything that did not fall into the clefts, draws the storms to the depth.

Stone appears on archival photos.

Actually, here and he is in the background. Photographed on the other side.

Eh - it is necessary to carry out a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya sails to the shore with the next small parts of the boat: some copper tubes, steel corners, wires in lead isolation. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. Not there was something. Cursed algae and easy excitement interfere.

We take away from him. Sasha Imbobache, sophisticatedly swearing, keeps his hand for the elbow. He had twice twice the stones, while he left the water. Taking photos found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of the three killed in 1942 at the shore of the boats.

The island of everything was surrounded by 8 boats in 1942 (one type of MO, five M-5 torpedo boats, one T-3 torpedo boat and one type W-4) and 3 M-5 torpedo boats in the fall of 1941. Most of them are still at the bottom of the island.

Under water in the cleft, some kind of copper boxed tube sticks out.

July 1942, Baltic Fleet

In July 1942 The command of the Baltic Fleet was attempted to capture Sommers Island.
Stabilized in the winter of 1941-42. The situation in Baltic again aggravated in the summer of 1942, when the Soviet submarines began to operate on communications. However, their path at the Finnish Bay ran past the island (Fin. Someri) - a small rocky island (950 sizes of 400 meters).

During the second half of 1941, it was a Soviet garrison, but then at the end of December the island was left by our units and soon the Finns were settled there. However, it did not succeed for a long time to strengthen the lands of the Earth with all the winds, and Sommers moved into the category of "neutral strip." But it lasted for a short time: when mastering the Gorean and a big tuiters in the spring of 1942, the Finnish command landed on the island of garrison (part of the 22nd individual coastal protection company), equipped with observation points and coastal battery. The island has become an important point of the Finnish-German anti-submarine defense system in the Finnish Gulf. Its garrison was 92 people, armament of 5 guns (two caliber 75-mm, three caliber of 45-mm), 7 20 mm of anti-aircraft guns, 2,81 mm mortar, 7 heavy and 5 light machine guns. The Finnish command really estimated the possibility of the Soviet landing, so 4 supporting points of defense were equipped on the island, which were equipped with a single defensive system. Standing white nights allowed enemy posts around the clock to control the surface atmosphere. When the command of the Baltic fleet in the summer company in 1942 began the massive direction of submarines from Leningrad on the enemy's communications, it was decided to correct the error and return the island under the control of Soviet troops. The author of the idea and plan of operation was the commander of the Kronstadt Naval Base - main base Baltic Fleet Captain 1 rank G. I. Levchenko. And therefore, under his general guidance, a plan was developed on his seizure, approved by the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet.
Prior to this, Vice-Admiral Gordea Ivanovich Levchenko as the Deputy Commissar of the National Security Committee participated in the defense of Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, and was the commander of the Crimea's troops, but for the surrender of Kerch in January 1941 he was lowered in military rank to captain 1 rank (see). So successfully successful Ivanovich was needed, what is called, the cover ...
Unfortunately, when developing a plan, a number of miscalculations were made. For example, the forces of the enemy were estimated as only in 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. For the capture of the island, a detachment of 250 people with ten machine guns was isolated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in people, the landing was noticeably inferior to him in firepower.
It was not possible to exploration to open up the enemy defense system, which included four well-equipped reference points. The peculiarities of the coast of the island were not taken into account, which led to the tragedy - when disembarking, who left the boats, well-armed and equipped fighters under the weight of the ammunition were often tone. There was no interaction with aviation, as a result of which the flare, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the suddenness factor, and the connection of paratroopers (as well as seafarers) was not provided with the pilots at all.
July 5 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko held a tactical game. The command of the operation in the sea was entrusted to the commander of the brigade of the capital boats of captain 2 rank V.A. Salamatian, landing squad headed captain 2 rank k.A. Shilov, a landing squad commanded Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to initial instructions, they decided not in three, but in four points. In accordance with this, four groups were also formed, the composition and location of which are shown in the scheme.

To the outcome July 7, 1942 All forces intended for the operation were fully prepared and at 23-33 at Lavensaari began landing the landing, loading of the ammunition and special property.

In April 20-11, the landing of the landing on the boat was completed, after another two minutes, the ships began to go to the raid.
At 00-30 The landing groups moved to Sommems. Their transition was provided by the disloisions, and from 00-35 four fighters.
To the o'clock at night The downhill of the cover went to the specified area.
At the same time, from 00-40 to 00-59 12 DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mino-torpedo shelf under the cover of fighters from a height of 2300-4000 m two waves hit the island. Bombed not too much - out of 120 discarded 100-kg bombs 37 fell into water. Finnish garrison replied to anti-aircraft fire. Then 2 plates of IL-2 attack aircraft were followed, which attacked with small heights by groups of 3 aircraft. It is not known what was the effectiveness of the storming, but two aircraft were damaged with fire 20-mm "erlikonov".
In 01-20. The landing groups unfolded and went to landing places.

The sea was relatively calm (excitement of up to three points), and visibility is just excellent (oh, these white nights). At a significant distance - 20-30 cable - Finns discovered the Soviet boats and opened a fierce fire on them. Despite this, the first group approached the shore at a distance of 10-12 m and began landing the landing, which ended in just five minutes. But at the same time, a torpedo boat No. 152 and "Hunter" MO-110 was damaged.
It was hard for the second group. Approaching the shelling, sailors and paratroopers were convinced that the boats could not close to him. Some of them had to repeat it several times, under the fire, trying to find comfortable places for disembarking. When unloading the radio station, it was so wet, or the batteries were drowned, and she could not work. The commander of the landing squad go to the shore in such conditions refused and was planted on the island only in 04-04 for the orders of the Commissioner of the brigade of the torpedo boats.
Losses grew - the body was damaged at the torpedo boat No. 62, and on the MO-402 - the add-on, the commander was killed, and 4 team members were injured.

III group met especially intense fire. It was not possible to approach the shore immediately, and the motors with couplings included on the front turn, and with the move of the motors with the move on the stones to the stones at the stocks. An attempt to save him was unsuccessful after landing the landing, and he stayed on the stones. Fortunately, it was possible to remove people, as well as documents and weapons. The commander of the MO-413 of this group, apparently, showed indecision and landed the fighters later than the rest, and he took him an additional order V.A. Salamatian.
But in the very difficult position it turned out to be the IV group. Her ships could not suppress the firing points of the enemy, having met a strong rebuff. The commander accepted the decision - landing fighters in a paragraph intended for the III group. But when the boat with the landing began to bypass, from the West, the damaged torpedo boat No. 71 was lagging behind. He had to land the paratroopers "Ababa where". During a waste, he was set fire to artillery fire and died, and his crew under the incessant shooting was switched to the torpedo boat No. 152. It went and the torpedo category No. 131 - His commander died, 4 paratroopers were killed.
A total of 164 soldiers taken aboard a detachment of 256 soldiers on the island fell on the island, 77 were injured on board a torpedo boat, and the Watchdog Boat MO-402 did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned when disembarking. Failed to be taken ashore and some of the machine guns (apparently, more, since it was just unthinkable to swim with Maximi).
The reaction of the Finns on the actions of the Soviet fleet was very fast and energetic - immediately after receiving a message from the Garrison of Sommers, he was thrown to help: gunboats, as well as 5 guard boats (weapons: 1 x 20-mm).
First to the place of battle arrived "Ousimaa", which was able to repel the attack of Soviet torpedo boats on the way to the island. Then "Hämeenmaa" and guard boats came up. During the fight with Finnish canal galodes, a torpedo boat No. 113 was killed (the commander - senior lieutenant A.I.Shumratov, attacked by the enemy together with the Boat No. 73. Sailors reported on the sinking of one of the gunners, but this information was unreliable.
During the battles, Sommers reported to the headquarters of both sides, as a rule, strongly exaggerated information about the enemy's losses, but for the Finns (overwhelmed their successes of only two times!) It did not have such serious consequences as for the Soviet command. After all, it was confident that a serious damage was applied to the enemy, and his ability to continue the struggle decrease. In fact, although many Finnish ships and boats have been damaged by varying severity, none of them have been accepted.
At about 03-18. From the paratroopers leading the battle on Sommemers, a conditional signal was received, which means: "I am fixed, I ask to send the second echelon." However, in response to the request of Salamatian from Levchenko with a half-hour delay, the answer was followed that the second echelon would be expelled after the island occupation.
And in Sommers there was a fierce fight. The paratroopers managed to capture one of the support points - ITAYAD, all the guns, which were destroyed, and from 26 defenders only Troim, managed to break through their own. The rest were killed or wounded.
Aviation was actively operating both sides. Soviet aircraft caused a few blows on the positions of the enemy on the island and attacked the ships and boats, while fighters reflected the raids of Finnish aircraft that caused bomb shelter to support the forces of support. During one of them, a torpedo boat No. 33 from the cover of the cover received small damage, and his commander was killed. The two enemy boats and canal breeding were injured.

Captain 1 rank Levchenko, realizing that battles unfolded much more serious than it was envisaged on the plans, ordered the gunner (speed 8-10 knot) to Sommems. From the count and battery bay (D.Shepelievo in 45 miles from Sommers to the south-east, where Lighthouse Shepelevsky, see) four torpedo and five guard boats were sent to strengthen their strengths.
In the morning watches on July 8 The activity of the parties decreased significantly, since the Soviet boats ended with fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish canoners were shot almost all the guests. But German approached the place of battle
At 08.48. The Baltic Fleet suffered a new loss: when approaching the eastern part of Sommers from the shell hits, the ammunition was exploded to deliver the paratroopers to the paratroopers.
Finns by 11-30 To help its garrison, the Germans managed to transfer on a gunboat and eight boats a company in 109 people.
The arrival of reinforcements finally changed the situation, the Soviet landing was in the hardest situation. Now the opponent's side was not only fire, but also numerical superiority. In addition, his canal galodes supported their troops with fire arms of the middle caliber, while on the Soviet boats there were only small-caliber guns. Expanded to Sommersa, our canalodka "Kama" was under the wiring of travelers, whose speed with trawls was very small. And although the Soviet coastal battery with Lavensaari joined the battle after noon, her fire was not adjusted and hardly brought a special benefit of paratroopers. The canalodka "Kama" came up with almost all his fireproof power was forced to send against Finnish ships.
In 14-30 The commander of the island sector of the coastal defense, which was part of the Kronstadsk VBM, captain 1 rank S.D. Solukhin ordered the landing of the reserve in the amount of 57 car guns, the loading of radio stations and food on the torpedo boats No. 11, 30 and 101.
About 16-00 They headed for Sommems and approximately 45 minutes under the fire of Finnish ships came to his eastern Bank And they began landing fighters and unloading supplies. Despite the fact that the case happened in the afternoon, everything was organized from hand badly - again, like at night, drowned the radio station, and with it 13 paratroopers. True, from the shore managed to remove 23 wounded. They became aware of them that there is a hard fight on the island and it is necessary to suppress the mining mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish communication with the landing, since, except for the wounded, there were no other fighters on the shore. Already at the departure, the torpedo boat No. 31 exploded and exploded.
It seems that the Soviet command was not prepared for serious battles for Sommers and there were no parts for Lavensaari, which could be sent to the rescue units without the threat of weakening the defense capability itself. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the landing time, and then it was too late - the German and Finnish planes, ships, boats and guns of the island's garrison made the delivery of reinforcements, supply, export of wounded, and then the evacuation of the remaining fighters impossible.
By evening on July 8 Instead of the Kama Kanoner boat, on which both instruments of the main caliber were faced, a guard ship was entered into battle and basic trails (special buildings that had strong artillery weapons entered). But their help is clearly late. By this time, the Finnish mining barriers "Riilahti" and Roouthsinsalmi (weapons: 2 x 75-mm, 2 x 40-mm, 1 x 20-mm, 3 pools,), and German ships - Floating "SAT 28 "(" OST ", 1 150-mm) is a re-equipped primer shalaland or dry cargo ship. It was officially listed by the heavy artillery carrier (Schwere Artillerie Trager - SAT). , Floa Base (Tender) "Nontelbek" (4x105mm guns?) And the trawl, who changed his fellow "M 18", which was pretty suffered from the raids of Soviet aviation. "M 37" took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. At times, he approached the shore of 500 m. His crew decided to demonstrate his "Brotherhood in Arms" to the Finns: the shock detachment from 10 people formed on the ship was sent to the ship, as well as several boxes with manual grenades, in which the garrison had a need. On July 9, the Soviet command took the last attempt to correct the situation. In the attack on the enemy ships, a torpedo boats were thrown by a storkeeper "Storm" together with the T-207 trash.

Three boats managed to release on one torpedo, but they did not reach the goals, and two boats were shot down. An attempt to deliver ammunition on the island of three watchdog boats is also overlooked. From entering the projectile, exploded and died with all those who were on board, including with the commander of the detachment of landing by captain 2 rank k.A. Shilov, Mo-306. And although the entire day the shootings between the enemy ships continued, the position of the landing on the island was hopeless. True, in the morning the pilots reported that they were torpeted by two enemy ships in five miles north of Sommers, but this message did not correspond to reality and could not change the situation. On July 9, at 12-30, the commander of the island sector of the coastal defense Radiogram reported to the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Vice-Admiral Tribussy and the commander of the main base Captain 1 rank Levchenko on the setting in the area of \u200b\u200bLavensaari Islands and Sommers. In the report it was said that to continue the operation of forces and funds, it was not available, and on the very Sommers from the zero hours on July 9th, hostilities are not observed. In 19-20 G.I.levchenko received a new message, where, in particular, it was said: "... no movement on the island is found. When the landing is detected, I will continue the capture operation. "
On the night of July 10, 1942 An attempt was made to deliver two intelligence officers to Sommers, but the blockade of the enemy's ships was too tight and the Soviet boat failed to approach it. Shipping between ships also did not bring results. The pilots have repeatedly reported on across the damaged ships, but it did not affect the activity of German-Finnish forces. In the afternoon, they tried to organize disembarrapping on Sommember again, but then transferred this surgery for the night.
At 01-00 July 11, 1942 Captain 1 rank G.I. Levchenko, believing that battles on Sommers ended and seeking to avoid new losses, decided to stop the operation.
In these battles killed seven torpedo boats and a small hunter of the Baltic Fleet. The basic trailer was damaged, and the Kama canoner boat was practically failed due to technical faults - although one of the guns managed to put into operation, but the steering was long in the canalodka and there was a long steering and it was necessary to carry it on a tug. Only for the first day of fighting damage received 10 torpedo, 5 watchdogs and 5 boats of other types.
But the Finns and this seemed a little, so they "enrolled in the list of their victories" 8 ships and boats across the coastal artillery, about 7 killed Soviet boats, and another canoner boat ("Volga") of the same type "Kame" and 2 boats I recorded Finnish aviation to your account. Finns and Germans recognized the damage to the trashman "M 18", Khääenmaa and Turunmaa canoner boats and several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army lost 15 people killed and 45 injuries, and the fleet - 6 killed and 18 wounded. Soviet losses in humans they were assessed as follows: 149 prisoners, 128 killed on the island and, approximately 200 more people, drowned together with the dead ships. After the end of the battles, the Finns covered Sommers with mine harnesses and he remained under their control until the release of Finland from the war in September 1944
Noting the weakness of planning and organization, the insecurity of the landing with special landing ships, the inaction of large ships of the Baltic fleet and the ineffectiveness of the fire of shore batteries, by no means sympathetic to the Soviet Side, the Swiss historian Y. Master was forced to admit: "Russian landing parts, although not enough numerous, like the crews of torpedo boats, fought very bravely, but they were not Save the position in this incorrectly organized operation. "

Order of the commissioning of the KBF for the seizure of the island of Sommers

In the period from 08.07 to 07/10/1942 The red-known Baltic fleet was carried out a landing operation with the aim of capturing about. Sommers.
Preparing and led the Operation of the commander of the main VBM Captain 1 rank Tov. Levchenko with his headquarters.
Despite the fact that the situation that established at the beginning allowed to successfully conduct it, the operation suffered a complete failure and the target was not achieved.
As a result of the analysis of the report on the operation and study the circumstances of the case in place, it turned out:
1. Planning and preparation of the operation was carried out badly, since: a) the documents performers were launched only 34-36 hours before the operation.
Preparation of personnel and material means in time was unacceptable limited and turned out to be completely unsatisfactory;
b) when developing surgery and documents, the commissioner of the landing unit was not attracted, the exact locations of the landing of the landing were not identified, the headquarters of GVMB did not make sure and did not check how Major Pasko did not understand his task, and most importantly, as far as he understood the need for the speed and determination of action on the shore.
Commanders of the TQ and boats MO were not sufficiently familiar with the nature of the depths and the coastal feature of the island, as a result of which, when landing the landing, the boats did not use the advantages of the coast of the island, which allowed the approach of boats close to the shore;
c) Documents developed for operation did not meet the requirements of BMSA and NBDSHS. A combat order is compiled unsatisfactory (the first point of combat order is informulated by a fuzzy, the third item is the idea of \u200b\u200bthe decision - there was no problem, the tasks of the departure of the landing in the order are not delivered).
The organization of the command to operation was defined in fumble, the combat management scheme was not, which led to the unsatisfactory state of combat management during the operation.
According to the combat order and actually the operation of the operation was carried out by two persons: captain 1 rank Tov. Levchenko and his 2nd deputy by order of the captain of 1 rank Tov. Solophin, but in fact commanded the operation of the captain 2 rank of Salamatin, which was entrusted with the operation of the operation on the sea.
Communication in the operation worked unsatisfactory and did not provide clarity of control.
2. The operation designed for suddenness and rapidness of action is properly ensured not in preparation or under its implementation. There was no accounting for the possibility of countering the canalodics, the Ministry of Events and the guardianship of the enemy, although data on their availability in the ASPE area and in Schkers north. Sommers in the headquarters of the main campaign were. Therefore, there was no sufficient forces for the cover. Artillery support for the landing was extremely weak. Aviation's actions were envisaged only when landed the landing.
3. The use of the TQ to land the landing was incorrect, since the experience of the CBF confirmed that the TQ for this purpose is little suitable due to the weak art. Weapons and low survivability. The task of landing on the departure of the landing under these conditions could successfully perform the boats of MO and even km, whose loss would be less noticeable for the fleet than the loss of the tite.
4. The actions of the TAP on the enemy ships were ineffective, due to the fact that
a) tactical training of boats was low;
b) The boat after recharging is ready to be immediately sent to the attack of 1-2 boats, and not by the groups, as a result of which the enemy ships are these attacks, consistent and with a large rupture in time, reflected in the focus of fire all ships.
5. Support ships (Kama CL and the "storm" and 2 BTSCH, who came the next day, were hersally and the goals were not reached.

6. At the time when the landing on the island has not moved and not moved, the enemy in the morning at 6.00 July 8 threw reinforcement. The swiftness and surprise of the operation were lost. Command (TOV. SOLOOKHIN AND TOV. Salamatin) did not show proper decisiveness to strengthen and ensure the assault. The enhancement of the landing was planted only on July 16.37, the Kama canal came to support 14.20 July 8 and the BTSCH and the TCR approached July 9, 42. Four car blinds were not participating in the transaction in Kronstadt.
7. Personal composition of the landing squad to this kind of operation requiring courage, speed and determination of actions was not prepared. The commander of the detachment of Pasko manifested criminal passivity and cowardice. After the death of the commissioner of the landing unit, the Polyrtruka Tov. Bunayreva squad remained without proper management.
Commander operation at sea Captain 2 rank Tov. Salamatin, previously noticing the cowardice of the commander of the landing of Pasko and knowing that the detachment was left without control, did not take the necessary measures to restore this department, putting at the head of one of the commanders at his disposal at his disposal.
8. On the use of Air Force:
a) In the planned table of GVMB headquarters, the task operation in the stages are not reflected for the Air Force as a whole, but are detailed up to the regiments and individual groups of aircraft.
Calculation of the task of the task and the headquarters of the Air Force should produce independently;
b) the tasks of the Air Force were delivered only for the period of transition and landing of the landing, in the future the use of aviation was not provided, and the commander of the Air Force for the entire depth of the operation was not oriented;
c) BCW strikes were little effective.
9. The KBF Military Council carried out general guidance without proper attracting his headquarters. The KBF headquarters was ignored both by the Military Council and the command of GVMB.
Head of the headquarters KBF Vice-Admiral Tov. Roll and Head of the Operational Department of the KBF headquarters Captain 1 rank Tov. Petrov did not show a personal initiative in managing the preparation of the operation.
The failure of the operation and the big losses of the fleet in people and combat boats were a consequence: a gross operational miscalculation (underestimating possible counteraction from the enemy ships and reassess its strength), poor training of people and means and a completely unsatisfactory organization of command and combat management. The great experience of fleets and especially on the CBF in carrying out landing operations in the current war, apparently passed by the Military Council of the CBF, the commander of GVMB and their headquarters. Order:
1. The Military Council of the CBF in the shortest possible time to organize the study of the experience of landing operations conducted in the current war in Black Sea, Northern Fleets and especially on its Baltic Theater, and make the necessary conclusions.
To study, brought first of all commanders and headquarters of the headquarters of compounds and VBM. Focus conveyed by September 10, 1942
2. Military Councils of Flotov (Flotilla) accept necessary measures, once and permanently committed with harmful phenomena of cleanness of superior headquarters, and, first of all, the fleet headquarters (flotilla) in parts conducted or compounds, regardless of their scale, as well as cases of ignoring individual commanders of their compounds and higher headquarters. Terminate the irresponsibility of commanders and headquarters in preparation and in the operation. Increase responsibility for the development of documents, not allowing such operational and tactical miscalculations. Any operational and tactical misconception in the operation and in battle to be considered as an irresponsible fulfillment of a combat mission, betraying the perpetrators to the court of the Military Tribunal.
Demand from military councils of fleets and flotillas their work, both on the campaign and coastal FCP, to organize so that the headquarters of fleets would really be organs of combat management, and not by the decisors of events in the back number so that no question associated with combat actions or Their provision would not be solved without the knowledge and opinion of the fleet's headquarters and primarily its operational department.

Kuznetsov

CVMA, f. 79, d. 39809, l. 250-256. Script.

Sea pilots as evaluated their actions to ensuring this landing operation: "In accordance with the extremely unsuccessful plan, 12 IL-4 caused a bombing strike on an island garrison an hour before disembarking, thereby predetermining the loss of suddenness and severe losses of assault groups. With a dawn, the enemy command pulsed a relatively large ship group to the area, not only supported by the garrison fire, but also replenished with his people and ammunition. In the future, the enemy managed to fully block our landing, which ultimately led to his complete death. At noon on July 9, ground fights ended. Without communicating with the shore, our boats for July 9-10 tried several times to land on the island of reinforcements, but they could not break through the blockade, or dot in battle. All this time of the Baltflut Air Force, which had indisputable domination in the air, was incessantly attacked enemy ships. Only the torpedo-axis of the 1st GMTAP committed 15 departures (Crews Drozdov, Buynovich, Presnyakov and the Sukadrillian Captain Captain Department of Captain V.A. Balebin) and dropped 12 torpedoes, reporting on the destruction of 2 gunboats and three watchdogs. However, from those who participated in the operation of Finnish and German ships (Finnish miner barriers "Rotsinsalmi", "Riilahti", Cavalon boats "Ousima", "Hämenmaa", "Turunmaa", German travelers "M 18", "M 37", heavy The floating "OST" and the floating "non-trap") was not one of the fuel. In most cases, torpedo attacks were perceived as a reset minus, but the morning attack on July 9, directed against Finnish minecraft, first passed in enemy documents as a torpedo. The Germans perceived this Finnish report with a certain proportion of skepticism - they themselves were still not convinced that the enemy had a torpedo-head in his arsenal. With a certain stretch to the results of the actions of the 1st GMTAP aircraft, only the damage can be attributed on July 11, the canalodics, at which a 20-mm gun exploded during the reflection of the next fly, killing two and wounding 8 people. Reprehension of Finnish fighters caused to the area of \u200b\u200bthe fighting area was damaged by IL-4 Presnyakov. The plane miraculously caught fire and sat with the village of Lavensari, with the extensive benzabaks.
The command of the brigade and the regiment remained obviously displeased with the results of the first blows. The report of the 1st GMTAP for the 13th Month of War (22.6-22.7.1942), in particular, said the following:
"12 aircraft-departures produced on the torpedo blows of the enemy ships were ineffective due to:
a) the insufficient degree of flight preparation and the lack of experience of combat torpedo attacks. As a result, the exit to the attack was carried out illiterately, all aircraft on the one hand, which gave the opportunity to ships an opponent at speed by maneuver, it is easy to shy away from attack.
b) Sight for trading was not used by all crews when entering the attack, throwing the torpedo to the eye, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the strike (crews neglected the sight of the PTN-5: Major Kuznetsova, Lieutenant Kudryashov, Captain Lithuanchuk).
c) Exit to the target and attack took place at an altitude of 50-30 meters, as a result, the crews did not define the location and construction of the enemy ships, could not quite accurately determine the elements of movement of them and choose the highest approach to attack.
d) The tasks for a torpedo hit were put on duty crews before departure in 20-30 minutes, which did not allow the crew preparation, and the crews went to fulfill the tasks with general pre-flight preparation. "




	Finnish Bay, USSR
	The death of the landing
Opponents
	Finland
	Germany
Commander
G. I. Levchenko	Unknown
Forces side
277 people, 11 boats	201 people, 5 guns

359 killed, prisoners and drowned, 63 wounded, surfacing 8 boats	21 killed, 69 wounded

Truck on Sommers Island 8-10 July 1942 - Tactical landing of the Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War.

Previous events

Sommers Island (Fin. Someri) is a small rocky island (950 sizes of 400 meters) in the Bullea, which occupies an important position, allowing them to control the sea communications between Leningrad and the central part of the Baltic Sea. Until December 1941, a Soviet garrison was located on the island, which was removed during the evacuation of the Soviet troops from the Hanko Peninsula. For some time he remained empty, but in the spring of 1942 the Finnish command landed on the island of garrison (part of the 22nd individual coastal protection company), equipped the observation point and coastal battery. The island has become an important point of the Finnish-German anti-submarine defense system in the Finnish Gulf. Its garrison was 92 people, armament of 5 guns (two caliber 75-mm, three caliber of 45-mm), 7 20 mm of anti-aircraft guns, 2,81 mm mortar, 7 heavy and 5 light machine guns. The Finnish command really estimated the possibility of the Soviet landing, so 4 supporting points of defense were equipped on the island, which were equipped with a single defensive system.

Preparation of the operation

When the command of the Baltic fleet in the summer company in 1942 began the massive direction of submarines from Leningrad on the enemy's communications, it was decided to correct the error and return the island under the control of Soviet troops. The author of the idea and plan of the operation was the commander of the Kronstadt naval base - the main base of the Baltic Fleet Captain 1 rank G. I. Levchenko (resulted from Vice Admirals in January 1942 for the surrender of Kerch).

For the capture of the island, a landing squad was prepared. The command of the operation is entrusted to the commander of the brigade of the capital boats of captain 2 rank V. A. Salamatin, the commander of the landing squad - the captain of 2 rank K. A. Shilov, the commander of the landing squad (256 people, 10 machine gunners) - Major I. V. Pasko. The overall management of the operation was carried out by G. I. Levchenko. The landing was scheduled for individual groups in four points. The initial point of the landing was the Soviet base on the island of Lavensaari.

Levchenko estimated the forces of the enemy in 70 people at 2-3 guns. The island defense system and the way of the approach of the landing boats were not.

Landing of landing and fighting July 8

On the night of July 8, a boat with a landing machine (4 guard boats, 7 torpedo boats) went to Sommems and about 01:00 nights came to the specified area. From 00:40 to 01:00 July 8, 12 DB-3 bombers from the 1st Guards Minno-torpedo shelf under the cover of fighters from a height of 2300-4000 m Two waves caused a bombing strike on the island (from 120 discarded 100-kg bombs 37 fell into water), then two groups of 3 Il-2 groups attacked the island from small heights. Two IL-2 were damaged, the effect of impact was insignificant, but the enemy was made to defense.

In conditions of clear weather and the "White Nights", Finns noticed the approach of boats at a significant distance - 20-30 cable - and opened fire. The boats managed to go to the shore, but it turned out that due to the large number of stones, they cannot come closely in the coastal rocks, and the depth of the shore was up to 5-10 meters. Part of the paratroopers drowned, was wetted and failed.

The Finns were filled with 1 TK-71 torpedo boat, one more (TK-121) sat on the stones, was left as the crew and then destroyed Finnov's artillery. Damaged by fire 3 torpedo boats and 2 boats "Small Hunter", among the crew members were killed and wounded. A total of 164 paratroopers were planted, 7 wounded and 15 people from the boat, who farefully come to the shore was returned to the base. The rest were killed, even 70 fighters drowned when disembarking. One group turned out to be planted not in the planned paragraph.

Having a message from the garrison of Sommers, the Finnish command urgently sent to him Wusimaa and Hämeenmaa canoner boats, 5 guard boats. Soviet torpedo boats entered them into battle, having lost one boat TK-113 dried out (the report on the sorting of the Finnish canonere boat turned out to be unreliable, but periodically indicated in the domestic literature). Aviation of both parties actively operated, while the Finns damaged one torpedo boat, and the Soviet pilots were two boats and achieved direct bombs in the canoner boat.

There was a cruel battle on the island. The paratroopers captured one of the support points, destroying all its guns and 23 of 26 defenders. However, Levchenko, having received a report on landing on the island and the request for the parcel of the second echelon of the landing, refused to send it to the complete take of the island. Instead, he sent Kama's canoner boat, 4 torpedo boats, 5 guard boats with a task to drive off the island of Finnish ships. The enemy also hastily sent additional forces - a detachment of German travelers. Between the ships, the sea battle was established, and therefore Soviet ships were unable to provide any support to the landed landing. One Soviet torpedo boat (TK-22) was sweeping.

At about 11:30, Finnish ships approached the island - the Turunmaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaao boat, and 8 boats, which landed garrison reinforcement (109 people). The Soviet landing was in the hardest position.

Only by 16:40 to the island with a three-Soviet torpedo boats, reinforcement (57 automatics) was planted. When disembarking under the fire, the enemy killed 13 people. It was accepted on board 23 wounded. When the Finnish coastal guns were dried out, the TK-31 torpedo boat.

By evening, on July 8, both instruments of the main caliber were faced on the Kama Kama Kamoner Boat. The Soviet command introduced a Watchman "Storm" and basic travelers T-205 Gafel and T-207 "Spire" into battle. But the enemy also pulled the Finnish ministers of Riilahti and Rooutsinsalmi, the German floating "SAT 28" ("Ost"), FloaBase (Tender) "Nettelbek", Merchal Mer 37. The Germans brought 10 people on a boat island and several drawers of hand grenades.

Martial steps on July 9

On the night of July 9, 3 torpedo boats were sent to the attack on the enemy ships, the storm guard ship, the T-207 trailer ended in to no effect, all three torpedo boats were damaged from the artillery of Finnish ships. Three guard boats with reinforcements were directed to the island itself, of which the Finnish artillery sank the Watchman MO-306. Reinforcements were not planted. Fight continued on the island.

Martial steps on July 10

From morning on July 10, a fight continued on the island, by noon he sat down and no longer renewed. There were no saved from the assault (except for 23 wounded, evacuated in the evening of July 8). Attempts to landing on the island of reconciliations ended to no avail. All day in the area of \u200b\u200bthe island, maritime battles and mutual strikes of aviation on ships were killed, the TK-83 torpedo boats died from the Soviet side and TK-123. On the night of July 11, the operation was discontinued, all Soviet ships were returned to the base.

Losses of Party

During the operation, 7 Soviet torpedo boats and 1 boat "Small Hunter" are surrounded, the base miner, 10 torpedo, 5 watchdogs, 5 other boats damaged. The Kama canoners boat failed due to technical faults. The Finnish command overestimated the number of across Soviet ships from 8 to 18. In air battles and during the attacks of the enemy ships, 4 Soviet aircraft are lost.

In the Soviet editions of the data loss data not published. For the first time, information about losses are indicated in the work of E. N. Abramov - general losses amounted to 359 killed and 63 wounded. According to Finnish data, 128 Soviet fighters died on the island and 149 were captured, about 200 more people allegedly drowned together with the dead ships.

The Finnish-German Fleet of Skilled Ships did not have (although Soviet pilots and Katerniks reported on "across" ships), damage to the M-18 traders, Khääenmaa and Turunmaa canoner boats, several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army lost 15 people killed and 45 injuries, the fleet - 6 killed and 18 wounded. On participating in battle, German ships were injured 6 crews.

Results of the operation

The island remained in the hands of the enemy. Strength mine bours were hurried around him and the Germans had a hurry. Sommers remained in the hands of Finns until the release of Finland from the war in September 1944, representing a serious obstacle to the forces of the Baltic Fleet.

The operation ended in failure due to major errors in its planning and conducting. Preparation was carried out in a hurry, although there was no need for urgency of the operation. Falling facilities (tenders) and small boats were not used.

Early in the morning, on the second day of our "cruise" on the "exotic" islands of the Finnish bay we went to Sommers Island. Unlike powerful and goreland, it is a small island, rocky with a minimum vegetation and a lot of picturesque rocky bays.

On the island, there is also a lighthouse, but it works in automatic mode, "that is, there is no caretaker with it, and the maintenance and repair of equipment is engaged in the hydrographic service, on the vessel we made our" cruise. " Near the Lighthouse there is a radiotechnical tower, built in 2005, it has established expensive equipment to observe the courts located in the entire Water area of \u200b\u200bthe Gulf of Finland, carrying border-security functions. On the tower there are motion sensors that react to approach it closer than 30 meters, and sending an instant signal to the dispatching points of St. Petersburg and Peterhof, as well as border guards. In general, the enemy will not pass the border Russian Federation Under reliable security!

Sommers Island departed to Russia in Nestadt world in 1721, and in 1723, I was granted by Peter I to his jester Jan Lakoste. But after the death of the king, his jester was unable to prove his right to the island (in the humble diplot instead of the press, the ruble was attached), and Sommers went to the treasury.

The Lighthouse on the island was built in 1808 and modernized in 1866. The Lighthouse was destroyed during the Second World War, and in 1945 was anew.

There is on the island and a newly abandoned border outpost with a very decent study base.

In December 1941, the Soviet garrison from the island was escaped, and Sommers soon occupied Finns. The island they strengthened well, the supervisory item arranged there, built a number of long-term firepoints and the coastal battery on the instrument of caliber 75 and 45 mm. Dys and gunpowders have nicely preserved to this day.

In the summer of 1942, the command of the Red Baltic Baltic Fleet decided to repel the island from Finns, landing the landing on him. The operation was preparing the commander of the Kronstadt naval base Captain I rank I.levchenko (the former Vice Admiral, deigned to the captains for the failure of the landing operation in Kerch).

And from the maneuverable base of the Baltic Fleet on the island of Lavensaari (powerful) on the night of July 8, 1942, 4 watchdogs and 7 torpedo boats came out. With the support of the air, the landing began landing at Sommers around one hour. But it was not possible to come close to the island of ships -

the paratroopers began disembarking, the Finns opened fire on them, finding a landing under the light of summer white night. During the shelling, about 70 paratroopers drowned, without going to the island. Finns sent the garrison of the island reinforcement in the form of two canoners and aviation. Near the island, the sea and air battle. The paratroopers who flooded to the shore stormed the cliffs of Sommers under the fire of Finnish dollars and batteries. The head of the operation I.levchenko, having received a message about landing the landing on the island, refused to send the second echelon of the landing until the island's complete takes. Instead of helping the paratroopers who have reached the island, he sent a reinforcement in the form of 4 torpedo and 5 guard boats and the Kama Cantorian boat. But the storming Finnish fortifications of the fighters did not help, - approaching Sommersu, the CBC court entered the fight with the detachment of German travelers who came to the aid of Finns. In the evening both sides pulled to the island of reinforcements in the form of ships with infantry on board. The KBF ships and aviation immediately entered the battle with the courts and the opponent's aircraft and did not affect what was happening on the island. But after all, 57 car masters managed to get to the island. With the storming of the fortified cliffs 13 of them, they were immediately killed. The Germans also managed to land on the island a couple of dozen fighters. Under the fire of Finnish fills, Soviet paratroopers died tens. The fight on the island of Sommers and around him continued until noon on July 10. The Soviet landing was destroyed.

During the two days, 7 Soviet torpedo boats and one "small hunter" were surrounded, 10 torpedo and 10 guard boats and one basic trailer were damaged. The Finnish-German fleet had small losses, and the data on living force losses would be very much. From the landing attached to Sommers, only one person survived. The operation of the Baltic Fleet ended in nothing - the island remained at the Finns and was released by Soviet sailors only in 1944

The bays around Sommers are littered with the bones of Soviet sailors and debris of German, Finnish and Soviet equipment. Here it is rapid for divers - lovers of military history. They found by them artifacts of the last war replenished the collections of many military museums of the North-West region of Russia.
We "stormed" an island on climbing rocks, risking to turn your neck and poorly imaging, as such assaults can be carried out under hurricane machine gun and artillery fire of the opponent.

Honor and Glory to Soviet seamans-paratroopers who fell death by brave on the island of Sommers because of the stupidity and short-sightedness of the command of the Baltic Fleet!

To be continued...