Battles for the Moonsund archipelago. Travel to the island of Saaremaa Torpedo boats island of Ezel August 1941
Baltic people in an internment camp in Sweden
In the list of losses of the Baltic Fleet at the beginning of the war, attention is drawn to a group of our auxiliary minesweepers, former tugs of the Izhorets type, with the same, but unusual fate:
TSCH No. 82 (used tug No. 23) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945
TSCH No. 85 (used tug No. 29) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945
TSCH No. 87 (used tug No. 34) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945
TSCH No. 89 (used tug No. 83) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945
The case is, in general, unique for the Soviet fleet. The tracks led to the legendary Moonsund, dating back to the First World War. They were interested in the circumstances of the internment: whether the exodus to Sweden was the only possible step in that situation or whether there was an unauthorized fact of surrender of a military unit with weapons. Here's what we found:
MOONSUND-41
A map that gives an idea of where the Soviet units closest to Moonsund were located. Hanko is the closest. And he held out until the winter of 1941.
In September 1941, the Moonsund defensive operation unfolded, during which ours held the islands of the archipelago of the same name on the western coast of Estonia: Saaremaa (Ezel), Hiiumaa (Dago), Muhu (Moon) and Vormsi. The Germans, in addition to their strategic interest in this area Baltic Sea, there was a task to stop Soviet bomber raids on Berlin, which caused significant propaganda damage to Germany. Our planes then took off from the island of Ezel.
By September 1941, the operational situation in the North-West had become critical. The Germans captured Tallinn, forcing the Baltic Fleet to make a difficult transition to Kronstadt, and were already approaching Leningrad. All South coast Gulf of Finland was occupied. On the northern shore of the bay, he fired back from the Finns of the Hanko Peninsula. There, ultimately, the defenders of Moonsund were partially evacuated.
October 13 An order was received from the command to evacuate the personnel of the Hiuma garrison to Hanko and Osmussar Island. The next day in the evening the evacuation began. By October 22, 570 people had been evacuated. The rest could not be evacuated for a number of reasons.
Minesweeper (former tug) "Izhorets"
PART 1. ESCAPE
There is not much information about the flight of the Moonsund defenders from the islands. There is an article in "Top Secret", but it is impossible to take it completely seriously, since it is written in the howling perestroika style. It mentions two former minesweepers No. 82 and No. 89 (initially minesweepers No. 62 and No. 69 appeared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents), which, in the evening September 21 1941 (this was before the order for a general evacuation came) having left Ezel (the Germans established control on the island in early October), after a short journey we found ourselves in Sweden with the intention of interning, i.e. surrender to the authorities of a non-belligerent country. Did all the officers, civilians and enlisted personnel on deck know about the destination? Hardly.
Sweden at that time, although it was neutral, was definitely not a country friendly to the USSR after the Winter War, and it, like other European “neutrals” such as Portugal, can be called a “non-combatant sympathizer” of the Reich.
The map shows that the fighting on Ösel and Dago continued until October, while the ships that reached Sweden left on September 21. Why on this day? September 20 was the date when the Germans made the most progress in their offensive on the island. The Soviet command partially lost control of the situation. The Germans, having complete air supremacy, pinned the defenders of Ezel to the ground and made it impossible to receive outside help. The situation was becoming critical.
By this time, on the island, in addition to its defenders, there had accumulated a large number of military personnel who came from the mainland, members of their families, administrative workers, builders of defense structures, sappers, sailors from faulty ships and vessels. There was even a district ensemble, the artist from which was later picked up from the water by the Germans, having shot down a seaplane that had taken off from Ezel.
There were cases of panic. The Germans took many prisoners.
And at this moment, minesweepers sent to a neighboring island of the archipelago to evacuate the personnel of the aviation unit suddenly unexpectedly find themselves in Sweden. It is probably worth paying attention to the fact that among the passengers there were a decent number of officers and junior commanders.
One more detail: from the Hanko Peninsula, the distance from which to Sweden is much shorter, there were no mass cases of internment. True, then, at the end of 1941, the situation on the fronts had already changed: the triumphal march of the Wehrmacht was slowly fading away and the evacuation from Hanko was organized.
Why did you decide to go to Sweden? The defenders of the islands had few options: try to reach Hanko on the remaining auxiliary ships, cross over to partisans in Estonia and Latvia, or go on foot to their own, surrender.
Of the entire list of Moonsund auxiliary minesweepers, one (No. 88) subsequently ended up in Leningrad. That is, a sea crossing for this type of vessel was, in principle, possible. Defense commander Hanko Kabanov recalls that on October 21, small boats and boats came to them from Hiuma. Those who wanted and were able got there, despite the opposition of the Germans and Finns.
It was difficult to get from the archipelago to territories not occupied by the enemy. The options that were chosen: Gotland Island (Sweden) and the Swedish coast itself. Although they were physically further than the Soviet base on Hanko. Without taking into account wind, currents and the activity of the enemy's air force and navy.
TWO CAMPS 
Apparently, after landing on the Swedish coast
Internees follow armed escort into the camp
From the moment our sailors landed on the Swedish coast, the history of internment camp No. III (Swedish: III Interneringslägret) near Büringe (Södermanland, Sweden) begins. It held 164 Soviet citizens. In addition to those who came on minesweepers, our military personnel were kept here, who later got out by boat from the Moonsund Islands to the Swedish island. Gotland.
There were several more camps in Sweden where Russians who had escaped from German captivity from Norwegian territory were kept.
Current page: 11 (book has 17 pages total) [available reading passage: 12 pages]
Following the scouts, the temporary commander of the 2nd battalion of the 151st PP, Hauptmann Pankov, ordered his battalion on the morning of September 16 to cross the dam and seize a bridgehead on the eastern shore of the island of Saaremaa. Due to the fact that the bridgehead on the eastern shore of Saaremaa was captured, the operation to cross the Veike Vein Strait was canceled, and the German units took turns crossing the dam to Saaremaa. By 20:00, four German battalions were already operating on this island.
On this day, the story of the missing fifth boat of the German special forces continued. The pilots who attacked the battery on Kyubassar reported that they saw two people in German uniforms who gave them signs. A message was sent to them, and they confirmed with the signs specified in it that there were no Soviet units in this place. To evacuate them, two He-59 seaplanes from the 9th Naval Aviation Squadron of the search and rescue service were used. The operation to rescue his soldiers was led by Hauptmann Benes. After splashdown, rifle and machine-gun fire was opened on these aircraft. One plane burned down and the second flew away. Pilot Oberfeldwebel P. Todte and pilot observer Lieutenant H. Zepke were wounded 273
Strelbitsky K. B. Losses of the German air force during the struggle for the Moonsund Islands from September 9 to October 21, 1941. Tsushima Forum. http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=1041&p=6
Hauptmann Benes found two of his soldiers in the reeds and, on two inflatable boats, took them and two wounded pilots out to sea, where they were picked up by a naval aircraft. Both rescued people said that while descending to the boat they were captured and shot in the back, pretending to be dead, they then hid in the reeds.
The Kriegsmarine, despite the significant waves, systematically carried out the movement of ships between Virtsu and Kuivastu along the corridor created by German minesweepers. The German command concentrated the main efforts of the minesweepers on creating a mine-safe corridor to conduct the landing flotilla to the north for a future landing operation on Hiiumaa. At the same time, the commander of the German minesweeper forces in the Gulf of Riga repeated diversionary operations as part of Operation Svedwind. These operations were now carried out without the towing caravans and coasters of the Ostsee IO, since they were already participating in the shuttle transport to Mukha.
During the day, Air Command "B" focused its main efforts on ensuring the crossing of its infantry across the dam and seizing a bridgehead on the eastern bank of Saaremaa. In addition, anti-aircraft batteries on the western edge of Triigi Bay and on Hiiumaa near Heltermaa were suppressed. The ships in Triigi Bay were bombed, as a result of which KTSh No. 1306, 1307, 1309, 1310, 1318 sank; the last boat MO-216, minesweeper No. 81, tug KP-11, transport "Volkhov" 274
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 100. L. 13–14.
During this day, the Germans lost 1 Bf-109 and 1 He-59 naval aircraft.
Table 14
In the operational report of the General Staff of the Red Army, the progress of the battles on Muhu Island is reflected as follows: “No. 172 on 20.00 16.09.1941: “At 15.00 13.9 the enemy landed troops on the island. Moon, Kubusar Peninsula (northern - eastern part of Ezel Island), there are fierce battles in which both sides suffer heavy losses. The enemy tried to land troops in Lyu Bay on the western coast of the island. Ezel with 6 transports, 8 destroyers and 11 torpedo boats. The landing party was repulsed, while 1 destroyer and 4 transports with enemy troops were destroyed, of which 3 transports with a displacement of 8,000 tons and one with a displacement of 4,000 tons.”
No. 176 on 20.00 09.18.1941: “On September 15, the enemy, with the support of ships and aircraft, landed troops of up to two regiments. Our units, with heavy fighting, retreated to the Orissary dam. Enemy attempts to land an amphibious assault force on the Kyubasar Peninsula (Ezel Island) were repulsed, while transport, 80 boats and boats were sunk, transport and a destroyer were damaged, and an enemy aircraft was shot down. The enemy airborne landing force on 7 gliders was destroyed. During September 16, up to 90 enemy aircraft bombed ships and coastal defense units on the island. Ezel. Losses are being clarified" 275
Information provided by K. B. Strelbitsky.
Ezel (September 17–23)
By the beginning of the fighting on Saaremaa, German troops, taking advantage of the confusion in the Soviet troops retreating from Muhu, crossed to east coast Saaremaa by dam. All possible reserves were thrown against the Germans: the 1st local Estonian rifle battalion, a cavalry detachment, a chemical company and the 10th sapper company. But attempts to dislodge the Germans from the bridgehead did not lead to success. Scattered attacks by Soviet troops were repulsed. German aviation took an active part in the battles.
After abandoning the Orissari positions, it was not possible to stop the Germans on the second line of defense. Commandant of Coastal Defense General Eliseev in his reports 276
The first report was made immediately upon arrival in Leningrad in October 1941 by the commandant of the BOBR, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service, Eliseev, and the commissioner of the BOBR, divisional commissar Zaitsev. The second report was made at a meeting of the command staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in March 1942 by the commandant of the BOBR, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service Eliseev.
And the report 277
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528.
The main reason for this failure is the betrayal of the battalion created from mobilized Estonians. In the second report, he states: “The Estonian reserve battalion located in Paide was thrown into battle under the half-house of Pumale - a dam, at the first contact with the enemy without a fight, completely in the amount of 1350 people went over to the side of the enemy, as a result of this the enemy broke through the Orissari position and began to spread alone group to the south, to Kyubassar, the second to the northwest towards Triga" 278
CVMA RF. F. 161 Op. 6. D. 26. L. 34.
However this fact does not find confirmation in German documents and memoirs.
The author has at his disposal the combat logs of the XXXXII AK and the 61st Infantry Division, books on the history of the 61st Infantry Division and the 151st Infantry Division, written by direct participants in the battles, including the commander of the 151st Infantry Division, Oberst Melzer. None of the sources mention the mass surrender of Red Army soldiers in the period from September 14 to October 4, 1941, much less the transfer of a full Soviet battalion to their side. The version about the transition of the Estonian battalion to the side of the Germans is not confirmed in Estonian sources either. Estonian historian Meelis Maripuu describes these events as follows: “After the German troops quickly crossed the Väike-Väin Strait, the Red Army’s defenses collapsed and a rapid retreat began. Local mobilized military personnel, when sent into battle, gradually, at the first opportunity, left Soviet units and surrendered to the Germans. One part managed to local residents get civilian clothes and cross the front line unnoticed. In the German rear they began to move towards their homelands. By this time, patrols from the formed Omakaitse were already patrolling the roads. Their task was to detain those who came from the Red Army. It was especially difficult for those who lived on the island of Muhu to go home, because the dam across the Väike-Väin Strait was guarded by Omakaitse. They turned a blind eye to fellow villagers who returned home and let them go in peace.” 279
Maripuu M. Esimene nõukogude aasta Saaremaal // Saaremaa. 2. Ajalugu. Majandus. Kultuur. Tallinn, 2007 (translation from Estonian by E. Kubi).
Veteran of this battalion A. Klaas also does not confirm the version of the transition in full force to the side of the Germans 280
Klaas A. In those days... / Kadakaste saarte kaitsel. – Tallinn, 1966 (Fortress at Sea, collection). P. 37.
The death of the “Estonian” battalion, as well as other reserve units, was probably due to bombing attacks by German aircraft. The reasons for the death of the cavalry detachment are visible in the dialogue between Vasily Riis and the commandant of Kuressaare, Major Fedorov, given in the memoirs of the former. He writes: “...I met the city commandant. “You know, our cavalry detachment...” he began, but I couldn’t listen to him to the end. His face and tone already said it all. "I know!" – I interrupted. “Two planes and ten minutes were enough... The times of the cavalry are over,” the commandant continued stubbornly. And with amazing clarity, the morning-fresh faces of the horsemen stood before my eyes.” 281
Riis V. On the line of fire / Kadakaste saarte kaitsel. – Tallinn, 1966 (Fortress at Sea, collection). P. 37.
The gap between Soviet units was struck by the 161st reconnaissance battalion of the 61st Infantry Division, which launched an attack on Kihelkona.
During September 17, the Germans continued to expand the bridgehead on Saaremaa and reached the line east of Triigi - Kardja - Mustla, cutting off Soviet units on the Kybassar Peninsula. On the same day, Muhu was finally captured. To clean it up and create Estonian self-defense (under German control), the 3rd Battalion of the 311th Infantry Division of the 217th Infantry Division was transferred from Virtsu to the island. The personnel of the 85th local rifle company of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the 43rd coastal battery and a detachment from the rifle battalion of Captain Ogorodnikov continued to defend on the Kyubassar peninsula, cut off from their troops.
On the night of September 17-18, the infantry regiments of the 61st Infantry Division repelled numerous counterattacks by Soviet troops. In the north of the island, a column of Soviet units defending the northeastern part of the island broke through the positions of the 176th infantry regiment. The basis of this group was the 1st Battalion of the 46th Regiment and, probably, the sailors of the Kuivastu OHR. The losses of the 176th brigade when repelling the attack amounted to 14 people. In the south, large units of Soviet troops, on trucks, with three tanks, attacked the positions of the 3rd battalion of the 162nd infantry regiment. The battle went on all night, the attack was repulsed. It was likely that a cavalry detachment was operating, which included three flamethrower tanks. The losses of the 162nd brigade were 53 people. Because of the night fighting, the Germans rested until lunchtime. Then they replenished supplies of ammunition, food and carried out deep reconnaissance. Units of the 151st infantry regiment and 161st rb were advancing mainly. 282
NARA. T-315. R-1013. F-000332-34 (document provided by A. Perestoronin, translated from German by V. Lobanov).
On September 17, the Kriegsmarine continued diversionary operations against the Soviet garrison of the islands - “Svedwind”. Again, landings were demonstrated and the Soviet coast was shelled in the areas of Abruka Island, the city of Kuressaare and the Keiguste Peninsula. During one of them (“Stimmung”), south coast On the island of Saaremaa, the minesweeper of the 17th flotilla M-1707 was blown up by a mine; it came under fire from our 3rd coastal battery and was abandoned by the crew, who lost only 14 people killed. A few hours later, it was discovered by a detachment of TKA captain-lieutenant Osipov, consisting of TKA No. 83, 154, 111 and 67. The personnel of the latter removed weapons (20-mm cannon and 5 rifles) and ammunition from the minesweeper and sank it with a torpedo 283
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 531. L. 209.
German aircraft bombed Keighuste Bay. Two TKAs No. 17 and 93 came under German attack. They were here after damage received on September 9. They could not be towed, since the tug "Riga" was laying out mine banks, and the remaining TKAs were on combat duty. At 10:38 a.m., a torpedo on the TKA-93 exploded as a result of a shrapnel hit. Both boats were destroyed 284
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 531. L. 205.
Two German floating batteries were used to combat the coastal battery on Kuressaare. Sweeping work continued on the minefield in the Greater Sound in order to create a fairway from north to south, for subsequent passage of ships to the north of Saaremaa for the purpose of carrying out an amphibious operation on Hiiumaa. The crossing of artillery and watercraft continued through the Viirs-Kurk Strait under fire from the Soviet 43rd battery.
The breakthrough of German troops on Saaremaa forced Kudryavtsev’s air group to relocate to the take-off site of the Sõrve Peninsula. At the Kogul airfield, fighters that were unable to take off due to malfunctions were destroyed: two I-153s and one Yak-1 and I-16 each. Aircraft of new designs could not take off from a small site on Syrve and were sent to Leningrad on September 17. Junior Lieutenant Naumov flew to the Bychye Pole airfield in a MiG-3. The plane was destroyed during landing, but the pilot remained unharmed. The Yak-1 landed at the Komendantsky airfield. Two Che-2s sent to Saaremaa were met by German fighters in the area of Nargen Island and returned to Leningrad 285
CVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 275, 276.
Early in the morning of this day, I./KG 77 and II./ZG 26 were again returned to the command of the I Air Corps and began flying to Leningrad. The remaining aircraft attacked coastal batteries in Keigust and Kybassaare, as well as anti-aircraft gun positions at Kogul airfield. Ships in the bays of Keiguste, Triigi and the Gulf of Riga were also successfully attacked by the Germans. In the afternoon, General von Wülisch, due to the start of the assault on Leningrad, was recalled to the headquarters of the 1st VF and handed over command of the air units to the commander of the Ostsee air command, Oberst von Wild.
In the operational report of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, the battles on this day are described as follows: “At 20.00 on September 19, 1941: “At 05.00 on 17.09, the enemy again tried to land troops in Keigust Bay (Ezel Island) with 5 minesweepers, 5 transports and torpedo boats. The enemy's attempt was repulsed by the actions of our coastal batteries. Under the cover of a smoke screen, the enemy retreated. 1 enemy transport was sunk. Battle at the Orisar Dam on the island. Ezel continues."
During September 18, the Germans continued their offensive on three fronts. In the north, along the coast, the 176th brigade was advancing. He had to take the hardest battle on the shore of Triigi Bay. Here the withdrawal of the 1st Sat of the 46th Regiment was covered by a detachment of communists and Komsomol members of the battalion and sailors of the OVR. German 88-mm anti-aircraft guns from the 111th Anti-Aircraft Regiment fired at the ships in the bay. The following ships were sunk: Helga, Triton and the ferry Kuivasto. 286
CVMA RF. D. 670. L. 27.
The OVR commander, Captain 3rd Rank Egorov, who remained in Triigi, and his team destroyed faulty boats and blew up the remaining stock of fuel and lubricants and a warehouse with aerial bombs. After that we went to Hiiumaa 287
The third separate rifle... forgotten. Collection of memoirs of participants in the defense of the Moonsund Islands in 1941 / Compiled by M. L. Kondratova, V. N. Lukin. – St. Petersburg, 2010. P. 273.
In the center, on Kuressaare, the 151st regiment was advancing. Between them the 161st rb was advancing. In the south, along the coast, the 162nd brigade was advancing. They were opposed by the remnants of the 85th local regiment and the 43rd BB. In the forest north of the battery, there was an attempt to use aerial bombs with weakened fuses suspended from trees, like tension mines. But this obstacle was destroyed by enemy aircraft 288
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 152.
After a fierce battle, the Germans captured the guns of the 43rd battery on Kybassaare. They were blown up by battery personnel. Now nothing threatened the crossing of the Germans from Virts to Kuivast except the storm that had begun. With the help of the 777th airborne engineer company, the German command deployed a second ferry crossing from Virtsu to Kuivastu. The German floating batteries began to fight the Soviet battery on Keygusta. During the attack on Kuressaare, German reconnaissance captured a Soviet howitzer battery of 122 mm guns on the march, and approximately 100 people surrendered. To comb the southeastern part of Saaremaa through Mukha in the afternoon, the 2nd battalion of the 311th infantry regiment of the 217th infantry division is transferred to this area. German aviation continued to fight Soviet coastal batteries, tried to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops and attacked Soviet ships in Triigi.
Operational report of the General Staff of the spacecraft No. 183 at 8.00 09.21.1941 reported: “Garrison o. Ezel, under enemy pressure, withdrew from the Orisar dam and by 01.00 19.9 occupied the line of the Kakhta-Laht Peninsula, Palo Kurdla, Koigi-Jarv, Karedi Manor, Kuhiguste, Kaaba, Triigi. A repeated attempt by the enemy to land troops in the Keygust area was repulsed, with one enemy transport sunk and two damaged. The stationary battery on the Kybossaar peninsula was blown up by personnel after all the ammunition had been shot. Enemy forces on Ezel Island are up to one and a half regiments with armored vehicles.”
The next day, September 19, the Germans continued their advance to the west. On the southeastern coast, German troops continued to resist in the area of Keiguste Bay by personnel of the 1st BB, 515th Ozenbat and one of the companies of the sailor detachment. As a result of the aerial bombardment, the commander of the anti-aircraft battery, Lieutenant Danilkin, was seriously wounded; his further fate is unknown. The commander of the coastal battery, Lieutenant Budaev, was seriously wounded in the legs. Not wanting to surrender, he shot himself 289
Chernov Yu. Meridians of Baltic Glory (Following the footsteps of the defense of the Moonsund Archipelago). – M., 1968. P. 71–72.
On this day, the Germans captured the 1st coastal battery on the Keiguste Peninsula. The guns were blown up by battery personnel. The Kriegsmarine continued to create a 300 m wide passage from south to north into Triigi Bay to concentrate the landing flotilla against Hiiumaa. The next day the Germans made their main efforts to capture Kuressaare. To do this, they concentrated the forces of the 151st and 162nd regiments against the Soviet group defending the city.
The greatest advance of German troops occurred on September 20. Soviet troops began to retreat to the Sõrve Peninsula. From the report of General Eliseev it is clear that he chose from two withdrawal options: to the island of Hiiumaa and the Sõrve peninsula of the island of Saaremaa. Due to the operational situation prevailing at that time of the battle, the second course of action was adopted. General Eliseev wrote: “By this time, the main floating assets had been destroyed by enemy aircraft, there were a few small minesweepers left on which no more than a battalion could be lifted without equipment, but this was also doubtful, because (as in the text. - Auto.) enemy aircraft constantly destroyed boats and small boats. It took at least ten nights to retreat, but only at night... They couldn’t hold out for that many days, so the decision was made to retreat in battle to the Svorbe Peninsula, for which to organize a number of lines... After the decision was made, all the ammunition, food, gasoline and warm uniforms transferred to Svorbe, organizing all economic organizations there. An airfield for our aviation was also prepared and built there.” 290
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 6. D. 28. L. 39.
However, the logic of events does not allow us to agree that there was an option to retreat to Hiiumaa. It is unlikely that in the turmoil of the retreat it would have been possible to withdraw all material supplies from Syrve in an organized manner within three days, and even to build an airfield on it. In addition, part of the forces of the Saaremaa garrison had not yet entered into battle at all and were located precisely on Syrve, these were the 69th Infantry Brigade and the 34th Infantry Infantry. Let’s get acquainted with the opinion of General Kabanov: “The error of the decision taken is obvious. The Gulf of Riga and the entire coast are in German hands. One battery of A. M. Stebel, even though it fought heroically, and four torpedo boats of V. P. Gumanenko with a dozen torpedoes still cannot protect the Irben Strait. So wouldn’t it be better to save at least part of the garrison and go to Hiiumaa, three times smaller than Saaremaa, so that together and with the help of the Hanko garrison, they could stubbornly defend both the island itself and the mouth of the Gulf of Finland? That’s what I thought and expressed it at the Hanko checkpoint then. I still think so now.” 291
Kabanov S. I. On distant approaches. – M., 1971. P. 240.
After the decision was made to redeploy the main forces and supplies to Sõrve and leave Kuressaare, local authorities also moved there. Their general headquarters was located in the village of Yameyala, in the farm of local teacher Eduard Punab 292
Puüa, Endel. Punane terror Saaremaal 1941. aastal. (Saaremaa Muuseumi toimetised. 3.) Kuressaare, 2006. P.40 (translation from Estonian by E. Kubi).
On Syrva, soldiers of the 12th Destroyer Battalion rounded up requisitioned cattle from all over the island. 293
Right there. P. 43.
Due to the rapid advance of the German 161st reconnaissance battalion, the Soviet command was unable to carry out a systematic and organized retreat to Syrve. Because of this, a crisis in management arose. General A.B. Eliseev briefly mentions it in his report: “The maneuverable nature of modern ground operations requires the widespread development of radio communications between individual units up to and including the company, which was not done in 3-OSB, where control was based on electrical communication means exposed to aviation and acts of sabotage" 294
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 6. D. 28. L. 58.
In a political report sent by the head of the political department of the BOBR, regimental commissar L.E. Kopnov and intercepted by the Germans, this crisis is described more specifically: “Cases of cowardice and panic have been identified. Among other things, a number of soldiers and commanders left their positions without orders. A significant part of the units, especially the commanders of the 3rd separate rifle brigade, turned out to be unable to fight in difficult conditions and lead their subordinates. The enemy air force destroyed telephone lines. The commanders of the various units did nothing to re-establish the interrupted connection. Intelligence was often very insufficient" 295
The consequence of this crisis was the removal of the chief of staff of the 3rd special brigade, Colonel V. M. Pimenov, from his post and his transfer to the post of chief of staff of the 69th special brigade. True, according to veterans, he continued to remain at brigade headquarters. Instead of V. M. Pimenov, the head of the operational department of the headquarters, Captain Ya. F. Yatsuk, was appointed to the post of chief of staff of the brigade. According to the recollections of veterans who went to Syrva without their subordinates, the commander and commissar of the 317th coastal battery were ordered by General Eliseev to return to the German rear for their personnel. Probably, senior lieutenant Osmanov and senior political instructor Lomonosov considered this order impossible to fulfill. “They went into the forest and allegedly committed suicide there.” 296
The third separate rifle... forgotten. Collection of memoirs of participants in the defense of the Moonsund Islands in 1941 / Compiled by M. L. Kondratova, V. N. Lukin. – St. Petersburg, 2010.
The commander and military commissar of the OVR, because they left Triiga for Hiiumaa, and not for Sõrve, the commandant of BOBR ordered to be arrested 297
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 111. L. 24.
The defense of the isthmus was personally organized by General Eliseev. According to the memoirs of veteran A.P. Uvarov: “While driving through the isthmus of the Svorbe Peninsula, I personally saw General Eliseev, in a worn leather raglan. He was pale, with red eyes from sleepless nights. It was towards evening. The general personally organized the defense in this place, stopped trucks on the road and sent them back to the rear for shells if the trucks were empty.” 298
Right there. P. 254.
Despite the resistance of the vanguards of the Soviet troops, the Germans continued their offensive. The reconnaissance battalion of the 61st Infantry Division broke through to the Aste airfield area and turned north. The main battle took place in the Mustjala area, after which a Soviet battery of 180 mm guns was captured. The guns were blown up. The reconnaissance battalion had difficulties in supplying troops. This happened because the water level in the Suur-Väin Strait dropped by 0.5 m; transports delivering cargo for the division had to be unloaded far from the shore. The command of the training detachment “Ostsee” described this situation as follows: “For many days the water level was so low that every time they tried to unload on the Moon, the ships sat on the rocks and then had to be pulled off by tugboats.” 299
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063400 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).
Therefore, the Kriegsmarine command decided to use heavy gliders to support the troops. They landed directly at the location of Soviet units and were destroyed. The last serviceable Soviet MBR-2 seaplanes left the Kihelkonna hydroairfield on September 20, 1941, after which the remaining ground personnel of the 15th squadron took part in the defense of the island of Saaremaa on land. During the flight to Oranienbaum from September 16 to 18, three MBR-2s went missing. They carried ten commanders and a cryptographer. Their fate is unknown 300
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 122. L. 475.
Minesweepers No. 82 and 89 were sent from Hiiumaa to pick up the ground personnel of the 15th Uae. However, they did not come to Kihelkona. Their search began on the morning of September 23, but was unsuccessful. Only some time later it became known that these minesweepers were interned in Swedish waters. And it was no coincidence that they got into them. Probably, out of fear of dying, under the impression of losses in Triigi Bay, the acting commander of the 8th minesweeper division, Lieutenant Commander I. P. Teplitsky, commander of minesweeper No. 82, senior lieutenant G. V. Ivanov and commander of minesweeper No. 89 , Lieutenant P.N. Krivolapov hatched a conspiracy to desert. They attracted part of the crew personnel to him. Having gone out to carry out a combat mission in Kihelkona, they, having killed political instructors Akulov and Yakovlev, headed to the shores of Sweden. In total, Sweden received from these ships: 13 medium commanders, 17 junior commanders and 30 Red Navy men. Some of them will then refuse to return to their homeland. These were the first defenders of the Moonsund Islands interned in Sweden.
On the night of September 19–20, five ICBMs-2 44th Airborne Division were sent to Saaremaa. Of these, three seaplanes were unable to land and flew back. Two landed, one of them flew back that same night, one remained 301
CVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 280.
The Battle of Leningrad demanded everything more troops. Therefore, from the subordination of the commander of the 61st Infantry Division, the 2nd Battalion of the 311th Infantry Division of the 217th Infantry Division and the 637th Heavy Motorized Artillery Division were withdrawn and sent to the east. On September 20, the command of the 61st Infantry Division began preparations for a landing operation against Soviet troops on the island of Hiiumaa. German intelligence suggested that the island's garrison was approximately 3-5 thousand people, 8 artillery batteries (including 5-6 coastal), 10 anti-aircraft batteries, defensive lines, mainly in the south, northwest and north of the island. At the same time, it was believed that the eastern and southeast coast Hiiumaa is less fortified. It was there that the main attack of the amphibious assault was planned by the forces of the 172nd infantry regiment 302
Melzer. Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln 1917–1941-1944. – 1960. S. 234 (translation from German – Central Scientific Translation Bureau of the Navy, Leningrad, 1962). pp. 67–68.
By 12 noon on September 21, the 151st and 162nd infantry regiments captured Kuressaare. The combing of the city began. Before leaving, the BOBR headquarters building was blown up. The Romassare pier, prepared for destruction, could not be blown up, since the infantry covering the pier withdrew and the demolition men died 303
The German 2nd battalion of the 162nd infantry regiment, passing through the city, captured the bridge across the Nasva River unexploded. The demolition charges on the bridge were neutralized. In the west, the 161st RB from the Mustjala area broke through to Kihelkone, where they captured two faulty ICBM-2s, after which reconnaissance patrols were sent to the northwest to comb the Hundsort Peninsula, to the south to capture Lümand and to the east to capture the Kogul airfield. During the withdrawal, construction forces No. 05 destroyed all valuable property at airfields, warehouses and piers: burned, blown up, flooded with water (cement). The iron remained undestroyed. The 3rd Special Brigade organized the destruction of cement stored in the north (6000 tons) 304
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 153.
Soviet batteries on the Hundsort Peninsula, structures and an ammunition depot at the airfield were blown up. According to German intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, the main forces of the Soviet garrison were retreating to the Syrve Peninsula. To verify this data, the commander of the 61st Infantry ordered the next day to attack in the direction of the peninsula with the forces of the 161st RB and the forward detachment of the 162nd Infantry Division. The remaining infantry regiments, the 176th and 151st, carried out combing in the northwest and central parts of Saaremaa, respectively.
The commandant of the BOBR, following the results of the battles until September 22, reported: “The enemy in three columns is pushing our units towards Arensburg. There is no strength to hold on to a broad front. I’m leaving for Tserel, preparing for the final battle. There were many losses of personnel and equipment from enemy aircraft. The Red Navy withstands the fighting, the 3rd brigade is holding out weakly. The Estonian battalions went over to the enemy's side. We will fight to the last" 305
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 111. L. 16.
On September 22, Kudryavtsev’s air group was reinforced with three I-16s and three I-153s from the Hanko air group (13th ap) 306
CVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 292.
The senior lieutenant of the group was G. D. Tsokolaev 307
Kabanov S. I. On distant approaches. – M., 1971. P. 242.
The appearance of this group caused an escalation of air combat. Senior lieutenants Krainov, Semenov, Tsokolaev and junior lieutenant Krainov shot down a German bomber over Cape Tserel. In turn, German fighters, Lieutenant W. Kretschmer and non-commissioned officer G. Normann, shot down two I-153 308
Prien J. Die Jagdflied erverbände der Deutschen Luftwffe 1934 bis 1945. Teil 6/II. S. 294–295. P. 292 (translation from German by V. Lobanov).
13th ap lieutenant K.L. Andreev (wounded) and junior lieutenant N.L. Shabanov (killed). On the same day, there was an air battle between a German seaplane and Soviet fighters over the island of Abruka. The Germans describe it as follows: “The Ostsee Air Command, Oberst von Wild, personally attacked the Abruk battery on this day with bombs and cannon fire and was able to fight in two battles with 1 I-16 and 2 I-153 in his seaplane (He-114 ) escape from the enemy without significant damage to your vehicle" 309
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063361 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).
One victory over a German seaplane on September 22 was credited to Major Leonovich, as well as a group victory to Lieutenant Khromov and Junior Lieutenant Shevtsov. On the same day, junior lieutenants Khromov and Shevtsov shot down a German Hs-126 short-range reconnaissance aircraft. Air battles continued the next day. Lieutenant Colonel Kudryavtsev chalked up two victories over fighters 310
CVMA. F. 226. Op. 27. D. 28656. L. 54.
However, these fighters do not appear on the lists of German losses. On September 23, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force command again tried to organize an air bridge to Saaremaa. Three MBR-2 44th ae at 22:45. flew to the island, but were forced to return due to bad weather conditions.
According to preliminary data from the Germans, by the evening of September 23, 3,305 people were captured on the islands. prisoners. In addition, up to and including September 22, the following weapons were captured: “5 tanks, 37 guns, 11 anti-aircraft guns, 20 anti-tank guns, 2 infantry guns, 44 mortars, 98 machine guns, about 400 hand weapons.” 311
NARA. T-311. R-51 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).
The Germans assessed the mood in the Soviet troops as follows: “The desire to fight itself is less than on the mainland, since the hopelessness of the situation is generally known. However, the commissars (there are now 40 of them on the Svorbe Peninsula alone) constantly forced the troops to resist. Means of influence: 1) the Germans shoot prisoners; 2) repressions against family members of defectors and prisoners by the government (exile and confiscation of property). There are few defectors" 312
Right there.
The alleged intentions of the Soviet troops were assessed as follows: “The troops must continue to offer stubborn resistance on Svorbe and Dago. The order to withdraw to Svorbe was given on September 20. The troops were told that they would be taken out by military and merchant ships." 313
Right there.
From September 21, the commander of the Ostsee air command was subordinated to the 506th Bomber Group under the command of Oberstleutnant V. Schwartz, which consisted of 9 Ju-88 A-4s and was based in Riga 314
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063359 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).
Number 9 includes only aircraft from the 1st and 3rd squadrons. In addition to the two headquarters aircraft, the commander of the 506th group was subordinate to the 2nd squadron of the 906th air group (4 Ju-88 A-4).
The German command tried on September 22 to break through to the Syrve Peninsula on the move with the help of the 162nd infantry regiment and the 161st reconnaissance battalion. However, all attempts to break through to the isthmus met with fierce resistance. In the combat log of the 61st Infantry Division, the situation was assessed as follows: “The fighting of the day confirmed that the enemy had withdrawn the main forces to Svorbe and would defend the peninsula with all his might. The division command asked itself the question: why did the enemy leave the entire island to offer resistance only on this peninsula, but a look at the map completely explains this. The thin isthmus at the entrance makes it possible to defend it with small forces, while at the same time the length of the peninsula does not make it possible to completely cover it with artillery fire. Finally, the armored battery on Tserele, already known since the First World War, blocks the Gulf of Riga at the southern tip of the peninsula. The strategic importance of Ezel lies precisely in the Svorbe Peninsula." 315
NARA. T-315. R-1013. F-000344-47 (document provided by A. Perestoronin, translated from German by V. Lobanov).
The higher command continued to remove the commander of the 61st Infantry Reinforcement Unit from subordination. According to the German higher command, the main task was completed, and on this day an order was issued to send the 254th construction battalion and a company of the 683rd construction battalion to Leningrad.
The BOBR command tried to create a powerful artillery group of coastal artillery on Syrva. However, time for this was also lost, and during the general retreat it was not possible to carry out the plan. During the evacuation of guns to the Sõrve Peninsula from the Hundsort Peninsula, only one gun from the 24th battery was delivered; the gun from the 25th battery and the personnel accompanying it were missing. Perhaps this is what is mentioned in the report of the German Air Command "B". True, it mentions two guns: “At Laadyala (the base of the Hundsort Peninsula. - Auto.) two heavy enemy guns being transported along the road were attacked by bombs and cannon and machine-gun fire, and the servants of the guns hid for so long that the advanced German units were able to capture both guns.” 316
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063357 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).
An attempt was also made to transfer two guns from Pamman (167th BB) to Syrve; the guns were removed and transported, but the road was cut off and both guns were apparently captured disassembled by the enemy 317
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 153.
The history of the defense of the Moonsund archipelago was incomparably less fortunate than, for example, the history of the defense of the Hanko Peninsula. There are several reasons for this. Defense documents have been lost, so to this day even the time frames of individual events require clarification. The head of the defense of Hanko, Lieutenant General S.I. Kabanov, survived the war and left quite detailed memoirs. And the commander of the troops on the Moonsund Islands, A. B. Eliseev, committed suicide at the end of 1942, which in itself casts a gloomy shade on the already tragic events. The Khankov garrison was evacuated, although with losses. Defenders of Moonsund for the most part died or were captured. Probably, someday a book should be published that will tell about those difficult times without anger or bias. In this work, we will try, to the best of our ability and ability, to highlight a number of points on which, we hope, we will be able to say something new.
Moonsund archipelago, consisting of two large islands Ezel (Saarema) and Dago (Hiiuma) and a number of small ones played an important role in the defense system of the Russian and Soviet Navy. The northern island, Dago, was the left flank of a mine and artillery position at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. The southern one, Ezel, covered the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.
With the accession of Estonia to Soviet Union Extensive engineering work began on the islands to build coastal batteries, airfields and ship bases. By the beginning of the war, Ezel had two 180 mm, three 130 mm and one 100 mm batteries, and by September 10, 1941, the construction of another 130 mm battery was completed. One 180 mm, one 152 mm, three 130 mm and one 100 mm coastal batteries were installed on Dago. Another 130-mm battery was mounted on the island of Abruka off the southern coast of Ezel, and two (180-mm and 130-mm) on the island of Osmussaar at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In connection with the threat of the enemy leaving the eastern direction, a 100-mm battery was temporarily installed on Muhu (Moon) island.
It should be noted that only 180-mm batteries (except for the Osmusaar battery) were built in a tower design. The rest were open, i.e., personnel and materiel were protected only by ring-shaped gun yards.
If the construction of coastal batteries, which was carried out through the People's Commissariat of the Navy, proceeded more or less intensively, then anti-landing defense began to be created in the spring of 1941, when the 3rd Infantry Brigade and two battalions of the 16th Infantry Division of the Baltic Military District arrived on the islands . We will not say anything particularly new if we emphasize that in order to build a defense on such a long coastline, it is very important to correctly determine the places where the enemy is supposed to land. In the spring of 1941, no one expected the rapid and so tragic development of events in the Baltic states for us. Naturally, anti-landing defense was created to repel a landing from the western direction, as was the case in the First World War. Unfortunately, we had to repel the attack from the wrong direction.
In addition, the state of the anti-landing defense could not but be affected by the duality of subordination: Ezel was in the zone of responsibility of the Baltic, and Dago - the Leningrad military district. And the coastal defense itself, until June 29, 1941, belonged to two different authorities: the Coastal Defense of the Gulf of Riga, commanded by General A. B. Eliseev, and the coastal defense of the Main Base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet - Tallinn. Only after the fall of Riga they were united into the Coastal Defense of the Baltic Region (BOBR).
Worthy of attention was given to the islands in the plans of the Wehrmacht. The capture of the Moonsund archipelago was already planned as part of Operation Barbarossa. Army Group North was given the following instructions regarding the islands of Ezel, Dago and Moon: “... such preparatory measures must be taken as will ensure their speedy occupation as soon as the situation allows.”
The rapid advance of the Wehrmacht in the Baltics required the acceleration of the development of more specific plans, called Beowulf 1 and Beowulf 2. According to the first, the landing was to be carried out from the northern coast of Courland in the area of the city of Arensburg with the forces of one infantry regiment. This option was supposed to be implemented only in the event of complete demoralization of the troops defending the islands. The Beowulf 2 plan more fully took into account the realities of rapidly changing events. According to him, the operation was supposed to be carried out from mainland Estonia, using Moon Island as an intermediate bridgehead.
An additional incentive to conquer the archipelago was the raids on Berlin carried out since the beginning of August by naval and long-range aviation aircraft based at the Cahul airfield on Ezel.
The exit of units of the enemy's 18th Army to the coast of the Gulf of Finland on August 7, as well as the general unfavorable development of the situation in the Leningrad direction, required the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to make a decision on the fate of the army and navy formations remaining in the west. One of the options proposed for consideration by the higher leadership was a plan for a joint offensive in the coastal sector of the joint forces of the Tallinn, Moonsund and Khankov groups. Another, less optimistic, suggested strengthening the troops of the 10th Rifle Corps in the Tallinn area with the garrisons of Hanko and Moonsund.
Today it is difficult to say how beneficial these decisions could be. But the option of tough defense of the occupied bridgeheads was chosen. And if a significant part of the troops was evacuated from Tallinn and Hanko, then the BOBR fighters suffered the worst fate. The question of plans for the evacuation of Moonsund is interesting in itself, so we will return to it below.
After a short pause, units of the German 42nd Army Corps (61st, 217th and 254th Infantry Divisions) on August 20 launched an offensive against units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army defending Tallinn. The left flank of the advancing corps was provided by the Friedrich group as part of the reinforced regiment of the 291st Infantry Division. The Germans gradually managed to advance to the outskirts of the city. On August 26, a decision was made to evacuate, which was carried out relatively successfully on the night of August 28. For several days, fighting continued with the remnants of Soviet units that did not have time to evacuate from the mainland. Group "Friedrich", in particular, was replaced by units of the 61st division.
It should be noted that the minimum attempt to use troops from Dago and Ezel in battles for Main base The CBF was nevertheless undertaken. On August 27, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction, the landing of one battalion of the 156th Infantry Regiment in Rohukylä and two battalions of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in Virtsu was organized. The landing and some advance into the interior of the mainland were carried out without much enemy resistance. This is explained primarily by the fact that the Germans concentrated their main forces to attack Tallinn from the south-east. The units operating on the left flank of the 42nd Army Corps carried out auxiliary tasks, limiting themselves to covering the coast. After the capture of Tallinn, the enemy forced the landing party to retreat back to the islands.
It must be admitted that landing tactical troops on the flank of an advancing enemy was “fashionable” in 1941. But, unfortunately, in most cases, other than losses, these events brought nothing. However, German historians note that when “cleaning up” the coast, parts of the Friedrich group and the 162nd regiment of the 61st Infantry Division that replaced it encountered serious resistance.
What forces did the defenders of Moonsund have at their disposal in mid-September to repel the landing? Modern literature gives figures for the number of troops accurate to the person: 18,615 on Ezel and Worms and 5,048 on Dago and Moon. However, the date of the calculations is not indicated. We think that the actual number of defenders at the beginning of the invasion does not exist in nature. Firstly, the documents of the defense of Moonsund on the Soviet side, as we have already noted, were lost. Secondly, at the beginning of September, part of the Moonsund garrison fought on the mainland and suffered losses, and part of the troops, which formally did not belong to it, could then withdraw to the islands. That is, it would be more correct to use round numbers: about 23 thousand people. The 3rd Rifle Brigade was a full-fledged formation, having two rifle and artillery regiments. In addition, there were several special units and non-standard units on the islands.
It is quite difficult to determine the composition of the aviation group on the archipelago. The latest publication talks about 12 fighter aircraft based at Ezel. At the same time, there are other data, although again without an exact reference to time. According to them, the air group consisted of 86 aircraft, including 24 I-153, 28 I-15, 17 MBR-2, three SB, 6 MiG-3, three Yak-1 and five Il-2. How much the number of island aviation had changed by the time of the landing is not known, but it can be assumed that we are talking about a figure greater than 12 fighters. We should not forget that there was (and was actually used during the battles) the possibility of strengthening the Moonsund group with the help of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force units based in Hanko.
The capture of Tallinn allowed the Germans to directly begin preparations for the landing on the Moonsund Islands. The same 42nd Army Corps was involved in the operation - although without the 254th Infantry Division. It was planned to use the 61st Infantry Division as a strike force. The 217th Infantry Division was entrusted with the task of protecting the coast and facilitating the landing; in particular, the 389th Infantry Regiment and the 150-mm howitzer division were subordinated to the 61st Infantry Division.
The landing forces received a very significant reinforcement: about four sapper battalions, four heavy artillery divisions, and an AIR division. The artillery group received the 114th Artillery Command (Arko 114) and the headquarters of the 609th Artillery Regiment as command and control bodies. It must be admitted that this group, which included guns with a caliber of 100 to 210 mm, could effectively influence both the field artillery of the defenders and stationary open-type batteries. Three coastal batteries (two Wehrmacht and one Navy) interacted with the landing forces. Especially for the operation, the III Division of the 161st Artillery Regiment of the 61st Infantry Division was equipped with mountain guns.
The Luftwaffe group was also quite solid for such a limited task. The first strike involved bomber aircraft from air groups KGr806, I./KG77, Me-109 fighters from the reserve group JG54 and heavy Me-110 fighters from II./ZG26. Reconnaissance and special missions over the sea were carried out by seaplanes of the 125th Naval Reconnaissance Air Group. The clearance of the straits from their own magnetic mines was carried out by Mausi minesweepers. From September 21, the 506th Bombardment Air Group, equipped with Junkers 88 aircraft, was also based in Riga. But by this time part of the original Luftwaffe group had already been transferred to Leningrad. Unfortunately, we were unable to find out the exact relocation schedule. However, judging by the available data, a return transfer was also carried out to ensure the landing on Dago.
The landing of the main landing forces was to be carried out on stormboats of the 904th, 905th and 906th teams. The capacity of the landing craft made it possible to raise no more than an infantry battalion at a time. The 1st battalion of the 151st Infantry Regiment was assigned to the first landing echelon, then, at intervals of 100 minutes, the remaining units of the regiment. The loading of the second echelon, the 162nd regiment, was supposed to begin 4.5 hours after the departure of the first assault boats. The auxiliary landing force of the 161st reconnaissance battalion (landing area - the northern tip of Moon) landed on more seaworthy craft: four high-speed landing barges, the same number of tugs and several boats.
The landing was originally planned for September 11, but due to a delay in the concentration of the 61st Division, it was postponed to the 14th.
Why do we consider the beginning of the Moonsund operation to be September 14, although the ninth part of the 217th division landed on Worms and captured the island three days later? This landing was of an auxiliary nature and was not further developed. The main blow was dealt elsewhere.
By the night of September 13, the troops of the 61st Infantry Division were concentrated in holding areas. At night, the loading of units of the first wave began. The crossing of the strait was carried out in the dark. The first boats with paratroopers of the 151st regiment moored to the shores of Moon in the morning twilight of September 14. Poor visibility led to the Germans landing further south than planned, directly in front of our strong point Kuivastu. One company completely lost orientation in the dark, made a circle and ended up on the mainland shore.
Nevertheless, the Germans were able to gain a foothold under fire on a narrow bridgehead no more than 50 meters deep. Unfortunately, the BOBR command did not have time to organize a counterattack in the dark. And with dawn, in addition to improved conditions for artillery fire, the Luftwaffe came into action. German authors emphasize the fact that aviation played a major role in maintaining the bridgehead. The enemy managed to gradually accumulate forces sufficient to develop an offensive, including the transfer of artillery around noon to directly support the infantry.
It must be said that on the first day of the landing, Soviet troops offered quite serious resistance to the landing. By noon, almost half of the stormbots were out of action. The losses of their crews on September 14 amounted to 74 people (out of 295 total losses on that day). The landing went behind schedule. The Wehrmacht machine malfunctioned, but still managed to cope with the crisis. By evening, the bridgehead was expanded to six kilometers along the front. By this time, the main landing forces had joined forces with the 161st reconnaissance battalion, which had landed on the northern tip of the island.
On September 15, the Germans began to use the Siebel and BDB ferries to transport the third, 176th, regiment. The enemy command, taking into account the strong resistance of Soviet units on the approaches to the Orizar Dam, planned an attack on the dam on the morning of the 16th. Thanks again to the support of the Luftwaffe, the problem was solved and the path to Ezel was open. By evening, a bridgehead had been created there, from which the offensive began deep into the island in three directions. By north coast The 176th Infantry Regiment was advancing, the 162nd was advancing in the southern direction towards Arensburg, and the 151st Regiment was operating in the central direction. With the capture of the 43rd battery on the Kybassaar peninsula on September 18, the Germans organized direct transportation of artillery and logistics on twenty Siebel ferries and nine BDBs. On September 21, Arensburg fell. On September 24, fierce fighting began on the Svorbe Peninsula.
It is interesting to note that the only air, or rather glider, landing carried out on the Eastern Front by the German Air Force took place precisely in the Monsund operation.
For the success of the landing on Moon, it was necessary to neutralize coastal battery No. 43 (three 130-mm cannons, battery commander, Senior Lieutenant V.G. Bukotkin) on the Kyubassaar Peninsula (Ezel Island). The battery greatly interfered with the concentration of forces and means for the upcoming landing and could complicate the actual crossing of the strait.
For some reason unknown to us, this task was entrusted to the Luftwaffe. True, the personnel of the landing party, called the “Benesh group” (named after the commander, Captain Benes), consisted of a company of the elite special forces regiment “Brandenburg”. A third of the company landed on gliders, two thirds on various types of ships assembled in the ports of the Estonian coast. The landing of the first glider landing (five gliders) was probably carried out by detachment 6./LLG1, armed with DFS-230 gliders.
On September 13, 1941, a detachment with ten gliders arrived in Pärnu, from where it carried out landing missions. The landing was planned to be carried out in the style of the capture of the Belgian fort Eben-Emael. The Brandenburgers were supposed to stun the Soviet artillerymen, literally falling on their heads. The success was to be consolidated by the main landing forces landing from ships on the coast. However, in reality, everything did not go according to the approved plans.
The operation began on the night of September 14. Apparently, the Germans did not have experienced navigators, so the groups of landing craft went off course and did not land in the given area. Things were no better for the glider pilots. The glider landing instead of the battery firing positions landed a kilometer to the north. This made it possible for Bukotkin’s fighters not only to organize a defense, but also to counterattack the enemy. To eliminate the landing, a part of the artillerymen was allocated under the leadership of senior political instructor G. A. Karpenko. The Brandenburgers were pushed back to the coast, the attack from the sea was repulsed by rapid direct fire, and the situation was saved only by the intervention of the Luftwaffe. The planes not only prevented our fighters from finishing off the unlucky gliders, but also dropped the latter’s inflatable boats. On them, the Germans were able to reach the ships that came to the rescue the next day. The batteries received submachine guns, ammunition, and even several flasks of rum as trophies. According to domestic sources, the number of glider troops was 125 people, but given that the DFS-230 glider took only 8–10 fighters on board, this number is clearly greatly overestimated. According to German data, the losses of the Benes Group were 12 killed, six wounded and four missing.
Unfortunately, we do not know the details of the operation from the German side. The fact that it was unsuccessful is generally confirmed by the brevity of the available foreign sources. There is even less information on the second glider landing on Ezel, which, according to Soviet sources, was landed on September 20 in the Mustjala area. A landing force of up to 150 people was destroyed by soldiers of the 2nd battalion of the 46th rifle regiment together with artillerymen of the 39th artillery regiment. In Kriegsmarine documents, this episode is mentioned a little later as “the first use of four 16-ton gliders.” Most likely, in this case we are talking about the first combat use of heavy landing gliders Me-321 “Giant”, which belonged to the 1st special detachment of heavy-duty gliders “Sonderstaffel (GS)1”. The detachment, which consisted of 5 gliders and 15 Me-110 tugs, was based in Riga. According to V. Hubach, the “Giants” were also used to supply the advanced units of the division.
Both glider landings did not have much impact on the course of the fighting on the islands. Here is the assessment (albeit in passing) of these special Luftwaffe operations by the Swiss historian Jürg Meister: “The interaction between the different branches of the armed forces can be assessed as good. The Luftwaffe deviated from the “general line” with its unsuccessful landing of the “Benesch group” and the unnecessary use of “Giant” gliders on Ezel.” Subsequently, transport units equipped with gliders were actively used by the Luftwaffe command to supply large and small “boilers” that increasingly appeared on the Eastern Front. But never for landing troops.
A few words about the participation in battles of units formed from local residents - Estonians. Domestic publications mention the Estonian operational battalion and two sapper companies. It is difficult to say whether we were talking about the 12th fighter battalion, formed in the first days of the war, or some other unit. One Estonian company was brought into battle on the island of Worms, the “operational” battalion - at the final stage of the battle for the Orisaara dam. In both cases, the overwhelming majority of Estonians, without accepting the battle, went over to the enemy’s side. The first comprehensive work on the history of the war in the Baltic, published in 1945, directly connects the loss of the battles in the Orisaara position with the betrayal of the Estonian battalion. Without denying the fact itself, we dare to say that in this case our command is to blame for throwing an unstable unit into a responsible counterattack. Moreover, at Worms a similar incident occurred almost a week earlier.
In the battles for the Svorbe Peninsula, relatively capital ships Kriegsmarine - cruisers Emden and Leipzig. Their participation was to a certain extent a matter of chance. When it became clear to the command of the German Navy that the Soviet fleet did not intend to break through from Leningrad to Sweden, the formation specially formed to intercept it began to return to its home base. “On the way,” two not very new and not very valuable cruisers were brought in to bombard the staunchly fighting last defenders of Ezel.
On September 26, both cruisers fired 360 six-inch shells. The result of the shelling was not observed due to poor visibility. The next day, the cruisers made two trips to the coast of the peninsula. This time the 315th battery responded energetically to them - albeit with only two guns. Soviet torpedo boats carried out a bold, although unsuccessful, attack. And finally, traces of two torpedoes fired from a submarine were noticed on the ships. This attack was the reason that cruiser operations at Svorbe were prohibited. The boat that thwarted the Nazis’ plans was most likely the Shch-319, which did not return from the military campaign. Subsequently, ships no larger than an M-type minesweeper operated against Svorbe.
The third cruiser, this time the Cologne, was involved in shelling coastal targets as the operation against Dago continued. Taking into account previous experience, the ship was given very solid security.
In general, the Kriegsmarine involved quite large forces for 1941 in the Moonsund operation. With the help of the fleet, the Germans managed to carry out a number of convincing diversionary maneuvers on the first day of the landing. Operation Südwind was planned in the Arensburg area. Operation Westwind was intended to demonstrate the landing on the western coast of Ezel, and a detachment codenamed Nordwind operated against Dago. In turn, Operation Südwind was divided into three sub-operations: Nau (involving four M-type minesweepers and 16 coastal vessels), Stimmung (seven minesweepers, two self-propelled floating batteries and four tugs) and Lel ( four minesweepers of type “M” and the same number of type R, two floating batteries, 7 tugs). In an operation against west coast Ezel used ships of the 2nd destroyer flotilla, 2nd and 3rd torpedo boat flotillas, transports, anti-submarine ships and small minesweepers.
The most famous was Operation Nordwind, in which both Finnish battleships, a number of other ships of the Finnish Navy and German light forces based in the Finnish skerries took part.
While leaving for the operation, the battleship Ilmarinen was blown up by a Soviet mine and lost with heavy casualties (271 people). Unfortunately, judging by the persistent descriptions in post-war (and rather late) literature of the successes of Soviet coastal batteries in repelling non-existent landings, false landings played a role.
In addition to participating in demonstration operations and shelling of the coast, Kriegsmarine ships covered the crossing of ground forces from possible actions of the Soviet fleet. However, Walter Melzer mentions the disruption of the crossing of a German infantry battalion by a “Soviet patrol ship” on the night of September 15. The unit was to land behind the 161st Reconnaissance Battalion on the northern tip of Moon.
The fighting on the last line of defense of Ezel lasted almost ten days and was very fierce. On the night of October 3–4, boats left for Dago, on which about 170 people were evacuated, including the commandant of the BOBR, General A. B. Eliseev. According to official version, an attempt to attract the ships available on Dago to evacuate the remaining fighters failed due to enemy opposition.
On October 6, the last radiogram from Ezel was received in Moscow: “I’m closing the radio watch, we’re going to the last and decisive battle.” The fact that the fighting on the island continued at least until October 5 is evidenced by the reports of enemy losses given in the appendix, as well as the history of the 61st Infantry Division. Now it’s the turn of the northern island of the archipelago.
Before the Germans landed on Dago, serious changes occurred in their group. In the twentieth of September, the 217th division gradually began to be transferred to Leningrad. Since September 23, the division has already fully become part of the 26th Army Corps. However, until the end of the operation, the 61st division was supported by a division of heavy howitzers from artillery regiment 217th Infantry Division. At the beginning of October, the command of the 42nd Army Corps also left for Crimea. The troops involved in the landing on Dago were now subordinate only to the command of the 61st Division (from October 9).
It should be noted that the German naval command proposed to capture Osmussaar before landing on Dago, which, in its opinion, would improve the conditions for navigation along the Tallinn-Helsinki route. However, the choice, as we know, was made in favor of Dago.
The landing of units of the 61st Infantry Division began on the morning of October 12. Through the Soelosund Strait to the southern coast of the island, troops were transported to the BDB, and assault boats served as direct means of landing. Both according to German documents and according to the recollections of the landing participants on the German side, the first wave of landing forces managed to reach the shore without interference from the enemy. The fire was opened suddenly, the ships ensuring the landing on the Kassarsky Reach were covered with the first salvos. Before they could set in motion, the minesweeper M-251 received a direct hit in bow- unfortunately, above the waterline. Whether this was a deliberate tactical move or whether our artillerymen simply noticed the approach of the landing party too late is difficult to say.
The defense of the northern island was both shorter and, judging by the enemy losses, less stubborn. Already on October 17, Soviet units retreated to the Takhuna Peninsula, where they held out until the 22nd.
If the evacuation of the last defenders of Ezel took place spontaneously, then they tried to save the Dago garrison, now subordinate to General S.I. Kabanov. General Kabanov writes in his memoirs that allegedly already in early October permission was received to evacuate Dago. But most likely, Sergei Ivanovich was somewhat ahead of the events, and the order to abandon Dago came already at the height of the fighting, on October 18.
Here we will dwell in some detail on the date of the decision to evacuate. In fact, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command authorized the evacuation of the islands on August 28 - however, after the completion of the fleet's breakthrough from Tallinn. As we know, no action was taken to develop this decision. Considering how the evacuation of Tallinn took place and the events that took place immediately after the fleet arrived in Kronstadt, one can assume that the Western “enclaves” were simply forgotten. Most likely, later, when the German landing became a fact, it was considered best to give the opportunity to “get bogged down” in battles in a secondary direction to a relatively large enemy group. This, by the way, is evidenced by attempts to supply the garrison with fuel and ammunition on transport planes from Leningrad and small ships from Hanko. It was only in October, when the advancing freeze-up made the defense of both Dago and Hanko hopeless, that the final decision to evacuate was made.
We know that from the entire garrison of the archipelago, 570 people were evacuated to Hanko. Someone must have been evacuated on transport planes. Some of the island's defenders ended up in Sweden. Thus, on October 19, a boat with ten Soviet servicemen was detained in the Stockholm skerries. In total, about 150 soldiers and officers of the Red Army reached the shores of the neutral state.
Could this figure be higher? In our opinion, it could. Firstly, the retreat of our troops to the Svorbe Peninsula took them away from the saving northern shore of Ezel, where the likelihood of crossing to Dago was higher. The reason for this was said to be a lack of transportation means. At the same time, it is known that on September 16 alone, German aircraft sank five boat minesweepers, a small hunter, a minesweeper, a tugboat and the Volkhov transport. From the memoirs of the defenders, it is known that there were a number of civilian ships on the islands, often ownerless. One of these ships, the schooner Maria, was used for evacuation on the 20th of October. And according to official data, 17 minesweepers were subordinate to BOBR. With some persistence, it was possible to attract this “fleet” to cross the Kassarsky Reach. In this case, the evacuation would be much more reliably covered by the available forces from the influence of enemy ships than the path along west bank Ezel.
Secondly, when the fate of Ezel was decided, it was possible to try to save at least the garrison of Dago. To do this, in addition to the ships based on Hanko, it was possible to risk part of the fleet forces from Kronstadt and Leningrad. As the experience of the campaigns against Hanko, which began a few days later, showed, the risk did not exceed reasonable limits. Moreover, troops supported by the fleet and feeling that they had not been forgotten would have held out even longer. However, history does not have a subjunctive mood.
We think the reader will be interested to know that the Germans did not intend to limit themselves to the landing operation against Moonsund. Among the planned but unimplemented measures was the landing of two battalions of the 61st Division on Osmussaar. There were negotiations between the Finnish and German commands about the transfer of the Hanko area to German troops, but then they decided to limit themselves to sending several heavy artillery divisions (54 guns in total) after the capture of Dago. However, the matter was also limited only by intentions.
Let us pay tribute to the heroic defenders of the Moonsund Islands. Being actually deep in the rear of the Germans, without receiving effective help from the higher command, they pinned down first the army corps and then the reinforced enemy division for more than a month. Moreover, at the very time when the fate of Leningrad was being decided. In addition, one cannot discount the losses that the Moonsundites inflicted on the enemy. This can be seen quite clearly from a comparison of the results of the Moonsund and Khankov defensive operations. In the first, the Germans lost 2,850 people, 15 aircraft, and several small ships. The Finns, when trying to break into the defenses of the Hanko Peninsula, and then in the “small war” in the skerries along its perimeter, lost, according to incomplete data, 486 people killed and missing. Sanitary losses amounted to 781 people. True, General Kabanov’s fighters suffered relatively small losses of their own: about two thousand people during the entire period of defense, including 797 irrevocable ones.
Table 1
Losses of the German air force during the Moonsund landing operation
| № | date | Place | Proverbs | Part | Type | Head and board. number | % damage | Fate of the crew |
| 1 | 06/09/41 | Ezel | RPO | 4./ZG26 | Bf-110 | ? | ? | = 1 |
| 2 | 07/09/41 | Ezel | BEHIND | 4./ZG26 | Bf-110 | ? | ? | =1 |
| 3 | 07/09/41 | Ezel | BEHIND | E-Gr./JG54 | Bf-109E | 1944 | 100 | +1 |
| 4 | 07/09/41 | ? | ? | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 3508 | 100 | +3, b/v 1 |
| 5 | 14/09/41 | ? | BEHIND | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 8502 | 100 | - |
| 6 | 14/09/41 | ? | VP | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 1202 | 100 | - |
| 7 | 14/09/41 | O. Werder | VP | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 6502 | 100 | = 1 |
| 8 | 14/09/41 | ae Riga | BEHIND | KGr806 | Ju88A-4 | 8503 | 30 | - |
| 9 | 15/09/41 | Parnu | BEHIND | SAGr125 | He-114B | 2572 | 30 | - |
| 10 | 16/09/41 | Ezel | RPO | 9. Seenot | He-59 | 1821 | 100 | =2 |
| 11 | 16/09/41 | ? | IA | E-Gr./JG54 | Bf-109E | 3269 | 100 | = 1 |
| 12 | 19/09/41 | Saare | - | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 2504 | 60 | =4 |
| 13 | 19/09/41 | Ezel | BEHIND | KGr806 | Ju-88 | ? | ? | =1 |
| 14 | 22/09/41 | Ezel | + | KGr806 | Ju-88D-1 | 1053 | 100 | + 1 |
| 15 | 22/09/41 | Arensburg | ? | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 6503 | 100 | +3,=1 |
| 16 | 22/09/41 | Parnu | IA | SAGr125 | He-114B | 2550 | 10 | - |
| 17 | 23/09/41 | Maisakila | BP | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 3516 | 05 | =1 |
| 18 | 24/09/41 | Arensburg | BEHIND | KGr806 | Ju-88A-4 | 1240 | 100 | - |
| 19 | 25/09/41 | Roya | BEHIND | 3./506 | Ju-88D-1 | 1075 | 40 | - |
| 20 | 27/09/41 | Riga | BEHIND | 2./906 | Ju-88 | 1167 | 40 | =2 |
| 21 | 27/09/41 | Ezel | BP | Sdst(GS) 1 | Bf-110C | 3631 | 100 | +2 |
| 22 | 27/09/41 | Ezel | BEHIND | Sdst(GS) 1 | Bf-110C | 3623 | 100 | +2 |
| 23 | 04/10/41 | (Ezel) | ? | 2./506 | Ju-88 | 1237 | 100 | +3, b/v 1 |
| 24 | 12/10/41 | O. Moon | Air defense | II./KG77 | Ju-88A-5 | 2238 | 70 | =1 |
| 25 | 26/10/41 | Moonsund | Mine explosion | SdKdo MR | Ju-52MS, | 2921 | 100 | =1 |
| 26 | 26/10/41 | Moonsund | Mine explosion | SdKdo MR | Ju-52MS | 2923 | 100 | =2 |
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The Moonsund Archipelago is a group of islands in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, separating it from the waters of the Gulf of Riga. In total, the archipelago includes over 500 islands, including 4 large ones: Saaremaa (Ezel), Hiuma (Dago), Muhu (Moon) and Vormsi. Geographical position The Moonsund Islands, separated from the mainland by the rather narrow straits of Soela-Väin and Muhu-Väin, made them extremely important in the matter of military control, both over the Gulf of Riga and over the eastern Baltic in general.
Before the First World War, the Moonsund archipelago belonged to the Russian Empire. In September-October 1917, as a result of the Moonsund operation, Kaiser Germany was able to capture the archipelago. But German control over the archipelago was short-lived. As a result of the Treaty of Versailles in 1920, the islands came under the jurisdiction of newly independent Estonia.
In 1940, after the Baltic republics joined the USSR, the Moonsund archipelago again returned to the control of the Russian state represented by the Soviet Union.
The Second World War again aggravated the importance of the archipelago in a military-geographical sense. In the same 1940, the formation of units of the coastal defensive Baltic region (BOBR) began. The construction of coastal fortifications, the equipment of positions for coastal batteries, as well as the equipment of bases for the Baltic Fleet began on the islands. Unfortunately, our country did not have time to fully implement all the planned work by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. It was possible to equip a significant defense system only in the western and northwestern directions. On the mainland side, the islands were virtually unprotected. But even in its unfinished state, the defensive area on the Moonsund archipelago had a significant influence on the course of events in the first months of the War.
The German command was also well aware of the exceptional military significance of the archipelago. Attempts to destroy the infrastructure on the islands began from the very first days of the War. German aviation repeatedly tried to crush the defenses of the archipelago, but the Reich command did not dare to undertake large-scale landing operations.
Beginning in July 1941, all military units, including the fleet and aviation, were reassigned to the commandant of the archipelago, General Eliseev.
Also, the BOBr troops were entrusted with the following tasks:
- Defend the Moonsund Islands.
- By periodic actions, disrupt enemy sea communications in the Gulf of Riga and the Irben Strait.
- Provide trawling, anti-submarine defense and other types of defense in your area.
- Ensure access to the Baltic Sea and the return of submarines, which could enter the Baltic Sea and return to their bases only through Moonsund and Soela-Vain.
The first months of the War were extremely difficult for our country. A series of defeats and retreat on all fronts affected the morale of the army. Germany was already rejoicing in anticipation of an imminent victory. On July 22, 1941, the first massive raid on Moscow was carried out. Goebbels' department trumpeted the imminent victory of the Reich and the complete defeat of Soviet aviation.
The fallacy of such statements was soon refuted by Soviet pilots. By the end of July 1941, the only territory not captured by the Germans from which our aircraft could attack Berlin remained the Moonsund Archipelago. Then the Headquarters decided to launch such a strike. The necessary logistical and technical means were secretly transferred to the islands, and the airfields of the archipelago were expanded to accommodate long-range aviation. On August 7, 1941, the 1st mine and torpedo aviation regiment of the Baltic Fleet, based on the island of Ezel, launched the first bomb attack on Berlin. In total, in August, Baltic pilots carried out about 10 massive raids. The actions of our aviation dealt a serious blow to the reputation of Goebbels’ department and infuriated Hitler, while simultaneously dispelling the myth of the invincibility and invulnerability of the Reich.
Despite the fact that Riga was abandoned by Soviet troops on July 1, 1941, the German command was able to begin the operation to capture the Moonsund Islands only in September 1941. All this time, BOBR aviation and naval forces largely constrained the actions of the German fleet in the eastern Baltic, thereby gaining invaluable time to prepare the defense of Leningrad.
The position of the defenders of the archipelago became seriously complicated when Tallinn fell. The Soviet command, under the threat of a complete blockade of the Baltic Fleet in the waters of the Gulf of Riga, was forced to withdraw ships based on the Moonsund Islands to Kronstadt and Leningrad. Thus, the garrison defending Moonsund was virtually isolated from supplies from the mainland.
On September 14, 1941, enemy troops landed on Muhu Island in two places - Kuivaste and Kalaste. The island's garrison, consisting of two battalions of the 79th Infantry Regiment and a pair of incomplete engineering and construction companies, put up stubborn resistance, almost completely destroying the landing force at Calaste. The Germans gained a foothold at Kuivaste and, having transferred more than four battalions there in one day, went on the offensive.
On the morning of the same day, the enemy made another attempt to land on the south-eastern coast of the island of Saaremaa with more than 40 ships. Having attacked from two directions, the Germans were repulsed everywhere. 12 boats and 2 trawlers were sunk by well-aimed fire from coastal batteries, up to 20 other ships were damaged, and the survivors hastened to retreat.
At the same time, the Nazis twice carried out an airborne assault on the Kybassare peninsula, but they were all destroyed by the personnel of coastal battery No. 43. Later, when the enemy invaded the island of Saaremaa, the battery soldiers again showed examples of courage and heroism. Finding themselves completely surrounded, they fought until the last shell, and then fought their way out of the encirclement..
It was a heroic battery. Its commander, Senior Lieutenant V.G. Bukotkin, being wounded (he received eleven shrapnel wounds), continued to command the battery until he lost consciousness. After the battery soldiers retreated to the Syrve Peninsula, Bukotkin, not yet recovering from his wounds, continued to direct the actions of the coastal battery.
When repelling enemy landings, the Muhu garrison defended literally every inch of land. A detachment of volunteers came to his aid from the island of Saaremaa. The fighting on the island lasted three days, the defending units suffered heavy losses and on September 17, by order of the command, they retreated to Saaremaa along the Orissara dam, after which they blew it up.
Even after blocking units of the Red Army, the Germans were unable to achieve a quick victory here. By the end of September, about 1,500 people remained in the ranks of the defenders of the archipelago with weak weapons and an insignificant supply of ammunition. There were no longer equipped defense lines on the peninsula, so the command of the Baltic defensive region decided to leave the Sõrve peninsula. Its defenders retreated to Cape Tserel and from there began to evacuate to the island of Hiiumaa on torpedo boats and motorboats. But it was not possible to transport most of the soldiers. The boats sent to rescue them were unable to reach the Sõrve Peninsula due to the storm and incessant shelling from the enemy. On October 4, the last telegram from the archipelago was received in Moscow, after which communication with the defenders of the island of Saaremaa was interrupted. The Moonsund defensive operation lasted more than a month and a half and was completed on October 22, 1941, when the remnants of the units defending the archipelago were evacuated to the Hanko Peninsula and Kronstadt.
And although it was not possible to hold the islands, their heroic defense seriously influenced the course of events in the Leningrad direction. The defenders of Moonsund managed to pin down significant forces of Army Group North, as well as limit the actions of the German fleet in the Baltic. All this, in turn, made it possible to better prepare Leningrad for defense and maintain the combat effectiveness of significant forces of the Baltic Fleet.
During the offensive of 1941, German troops significantly advanced east in the Leningrad direction and almost completely blocked the “northern capital”, but they still failed to achieve their main goals. Leningrad survived, and with it the Baltic Fleet survived. Although the Baltic suffered serious losses, the fleet remained a serious force capable of radically changing the balance of power in the Baltic Sea. By mid-1942, the front had finally stabilized. Relative calm continued until the beginning of 1944.
